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Abstract

This Article explores the division of war-making authority between the President
and Congress through the prism of positive political theory. For the most part,
the scholarly treatment of the war-powers debate has been normative with various
commentators offering various textual or functional accounts of what the proper
allocation of war-making authority should be. This Article provides a positive account of the war-making powers by focusing on the domestic political constraints
that the political branches face in the context of an imminent military build-up or
troop deployment. This Article assumes that the President has the exclusive ability to influence the scope of an international crisis that precedes an actual armed
conflict by making public threats against foreign states. Once such public threats
reach a critical threshold, however, backing down by any domestic institutional
actor becomes difficult due to the presence of significant domestic audience costs.
In other words, since a domestic audience is likely to punish any domestic institutional actor that attempts to back down from an escalating international crisis,
neither Congress nor the courts have much of an incentive to intervene once the
President decides to initiate conflict. The President thus has a significant institutional advantage in framing the domestic audience costs for going to war. Given
this apparent agenda-setting advantage, however, it is puzzling as to why the President would ever seek congressional authorization before initiating international
conflicts. This Article argues that the presidential decision to seek congressional
authorization is determined by a two-level strategic game of domestic and international interaction. At the domestic level, once the President decides to initiate
conflict, he has an incentive to seek congressional authorization as a form of political insurance if he believes that the war is going to be fairly long or costly, or if
he is uncertain about the prospects of victory. At the international level, the President also has an incentive to seek congressional authorization if he is uncertain

about the outcome of the conflict and wants to send a costly signal to the foreign
enemy about the country’s resolve to prosecute the conflict. In sum, the ex-ante
beliefs of the President regarding the outcome of a conflict and the possibility of
subsequent punishment by a domestic audience ultimately determine his decision
to seek congressional authorization. Finally, this Article also argues that Congress
has an incentive to constrain the President’s war-making agenda in the shadow of
a politically unpopular war. But while the President often shapes public opinion in
his war powers role, Congress tends to react to public opinion when it constrains
the President’s war initiatives. This Article uses historical case studies, including
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, to test these theoretical arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary media accounts of most extant American uses of force, including
the ongoing Iraqi crisis, are often rife with speculation about when American military
involvement will end.1 But from an institutional perspective, there are many more
interesting questions regarding the varying roles of Congress and the President in
initiating and terminating wars. For instance, following the pattern set by previous
administrations, President Bush, rather than Congress, took the lead in initiating the war
in Iraq. But why was President Bush able to dominate the agenda at the initiation of
1

See, e.g., Frederick Barton, et al., Should We Stay or Should We Go?, NY T IMES, January 19, 2005
at A 19; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Washington Memo; Hot Topic: How U.S. Might Disengage in Iraq,
NY T IMES, January 10, 2005, at A1.
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military hostilities? Also, why do presidents sometimes seek congressional approval when
they initiate certain wars but not others? What is the likelihood that the President will
take the lead in ending the current American military involvement in Iraq? Are there
specific circumstances that dictate when the President will take the lead in terminating a
conflict and when the President will follow Congress’s lead? As a practical matter, does
the Constitution actually play a role in resolving any of these quandaries?
Interestingly, although there is a plethora of legal scholarship on war powers,
hardly any of it focuses on the various questions raised above regarding the interaction of
the political branches in use of force incidents. Rather, much of the scholarship tends to
advance competing normative claims about the proper division of war powers. On one
side of the debate, pro-President scholars stress the importance of strength and flexibility
in an executive that is not fettered in his foreign policy goals by parochial legislators. 2 On
the other side of the debate, pro-Congress scholars argue that a legislative check on the
President’s foreign policy actions encourages democratic accountability and effective
scrutiny.3 While the gulf between these two camps in the war powers debate is quite
extensive, they both seem to be in agreement on one point: Congress is relatively
impotent in war powers. 4
2

John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CAL L. REV. 167, 303-304 (1996) (citing Federalist arguments for vesting war-making powers in
a single individual, the independent president, because he would represent the entire nation and be able to
act swiftly and decisively); see also William Treanor, Fame, Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 696 (1997) (listing those scholars that advocate a pro-presidential view of war
powers). More recently, debates have ensued as to whether the Vesting Clause of Article II gives the
President broad residual powers in foreign affairs. Cf. Curtis Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 560-85 (2004) (suggesting that textual language and
early history do not support theory that Vesting Clause provides broad residual power in the President);
Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 324-27
(2001) (arguing for an expansive view of presidential power under the Vesting Clause).
3
See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, T HE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 205-06 (1996)(arguing that separation of powers ensures that each branch can
limit the powers of the others, thereby saving the people from autocracy); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1993) (citing both the slowing down of the war-making process and the democratic
nature of the House as the Framers’ primary rationales for including the House in the decision to go to
war.); W. T AYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 72 (1981) (listing the
purposes behind the Framers’ division over war powers between Congress and the President). Pro-Congress
scholars point to the extensive constitutional language that seems to give Congress a prominent role in
foreign affairs. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl.11.; ELY, supra note __ at 3 (outlining the Constitutional
Convention’s debate and decision to vest in Congress the power to declare war); LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1 (1995) (describing Framers’ decision to vest the power to initiate war in
Congress as a result of lessons learned from European nations).
4
See generally Harold Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON
WAR AND SPENDING (2000); see also REVELEY , supra note __ at 134 (“To date, however, the legislators have
proved unable to reassert themselves once and for all by establishing enduring channels for a Congressional
voice in decisions about war and peace”); ELY, supra note __at 48 (“Since 1950, [Congress] realized, it had
been dodging its constitutional duty to make the decision whether to commit American troops to combat.
Instead it had been laying back, neither disapproving presidential military ventures nor forthrightly
approving them, instead letting the president use troops wherever and whenever he wanted and waiting to
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What is lacking in these debates, however, is a coherent theoretical account of
how the President and Congress actually interact on war powers issues. In other words, if
Congress is so weak, why would the President ever seek congressional authorization to go
to war? Conversely, if the President is so powerful, why is Congress able to constrain his
national security choices in certain circumstances, such as in terminating a war?
This Article attempts to fill the gap in the war powers debate by presenting a
theoretical framework that seeks to answer two related questions: (1) when, if ever, is the
President likely to seek congressional approval before embarking on a use of force
campaign?; and (2) when, if ever, is Congress likely to constrain the President’s decision
to use force?
Employing the tools and insights of positive political theory, this Article explores
the division of war-making authority between the President and Congress by focusing on
the domestic audience constraints that the political branches face in the context of an
imminent military buildup or troop deployment. This Article assumes that at the conflict
initiation stage, the President enjoys an agenda setting advantage over Congress because
he has the power to influence the domestic audience costs for going to war. In other
words, because the President has the exclusive ability to create and escalate an
international crisis, he can effectively lock-in the other branches of government to his
preferred course of military action knowing that any institutional actor that attempts to
back out of the crisis will likely face punishment by a domestic audience. Thus, by
precipitating “back out” costs and a “rally around the flag effect” among the domestic
audience, the President can effectively “constrain” the scope of Congress’s war-powers.
Given the President’s apparent dominance over the crisis escalation agenda at the
initiation of a conflict, however, why would the President ever seek Congress’s approval
before going to war? After all, the courts rarely ever intervene in separation of powers
disputes regarding war-making authority and members of Congress who stand in the way
of the President’s war-making decisions face significant electoral risks. 5
The answer is that the President’s control over the war-making agenda is neither
exclusive nor complete. Indeed, although the President may dominate the “rally around
the flag” effect at the conflict initiation stage, he has less control over the course and
outcome of any specific war, such as the monetary and psychological costs of the war, how
see how the war in question played politically,” which resulted in the passage of the War Powers Act); Yoo,
supra note __, at 182 (pointing out that Congress has never sought to take available measures against
presidents who refuse to comply with the War Powers Act); and KOH, supra note __ at 117 (Congress
acquiesces to President in foreign affairs through “legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective
legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will”).
5
See, e.g., Richard Stoll, The Sound of Guns: Is there a Congressional Rally after U.S. Military Action,
15 AMER. POL. Q. 223, 225 (1987); see also James Regens, Ronald Gaddie & Brad Lockerbie, The Electoral
Consequences of Voting to Declare War, 39 J. CONFLICT RES. 168, 174-75 (1995) (showing that members of
Congress who opposed the U.S. entry into WWI were less likely to be reelected than those who voted for
entry but not finding statistically significant differences in Persian Gulf war and Mexican American war).
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long the war will last, or whether failure or stalemate can be avoided. As the President’s
ex-ante beliefs of the risks of an unfavorable outcome increase, the President’s calculus of
the risks involved in going to war without congressional authorization also change.
This Article argues that this calculus is dependent on a two-level strategic
interaction in which both levels of the interaction are interdependent. At the domestic
level, this Article argues that the President is likely to seek congressional authorization as
a form of political insurance if he believes that there is a significant enough risk that the
war will go wrong. In other words, when there is a significant enough risk of military
failure or stalemate, the President has an incentive to spread the costs of decision-making
among other political actors in order to prevent those actors from subsequently exploiting
the President’s misfortunes. At the international level, the President also has an
incentive to seek congressional authorization when the outcome of the war is uncertain in
order to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’ resolve to
prosecute the conflict. Both of these levels are interdependent because the perception
that both political branches are not in accord in the prosecution of a conflict may
embolden a foreign adversary, thereby increasing the chance of military failure or
stalemate. In sum, because of the significant domestic audience costs associated with
failure or stalemate in foreign military engagements (including costly but ultimately
successful conflicts), the President will be less likely to initiate conflict without
congressional authorization unless he is assured of relatively rapid military success.
Correspondingly, this theoretical model suggests that Congress also has an
incentive to constrain the President’s war-making authority in the shadow of an
unpopular military undertaking. Indeed, presidents who embark on military adventures
face an acute dilemma: while the use of military force is likely to generate a favorable
public response in the short run, costly or failed military adventures are also likely to
generate a subsequent backlash by the domestic audience. Thus, if the President is facing
possible military failure or stalemate, members of Congress, especially those of the
opposing party, are usually poised to take advantage of the President’s misfortunes to
mobilize opposition to the President’s agenda. On those occasions, members of Congress
are able to deploy a variety of mechanisms to constrain the President’s war-making
initiatives, including denial of funds for military engagements, use of procedural devices
that restrict the scope of presidential decision-making, threats to derail the president’s
political agenda, and occasionally the threat of impeachment. The conventional wisdom
often dismisses such legislative constraints, such as the War Powers Resolution, as being
useless and purely symbolic. 6 This Article suggests that far from being useless as a
constraint on the President’s authority, the War Powers Resolution is actually an
ingenious piece of legislation that allows members of Congress to intervene selectively
6

See KOH, supra note __ at 39 (“[T]he resolution has… failed to prevent even the type of creeping
escalation that it was expressly enacted to control”); ELY, supra note __ at 61 (describing the “bad aura”
and general disrespect for the War Powers Resolution, which leads Courts to go out of their way to avoid
enforcing it); BARBARA HINCKLEY , LESS T HAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH
OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS 99 (1994) (“Decision making since the War Powers Act appears remarkably
like the decision making before. . .”).
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and strategically in war-making decisions once there are clear political payoffs for doing
so.
This Article also suggests that the role that public opinion plays in the separation
of war powers between the President and Congress is strikingly different. While the
President tries to frame and shape public opinion on use of force decisions, Congress
tends to react to public opinion. Members of Congress, including those in the opposition,
are aware that presidential popularity during an international crisis is often very relevant
to their electoral fortunes. When the President’s war initiatives are popular, members of
Congress from both sides of the spectrum will often jump on the war bandwagon and
support the President. When public opinion turns against the President, however,
members of Congress, including those in the President’s party, seem to be more willing to
constrain the President’s initiatives. The President, on the other hand, does not generally
react to negative public opinion in his war-making initiatives. Indeed, the President is
aware that withdrawal of troops in the face of negative public opinion is likely to be
construed as an admission of failure and incompetence. Rather than follow the course of
public opinion when the war is going badly, the President is more likely to entrench
himself into a war and gamble that the course of the war (and public opinion) will change
in his favor. Thus, a presidential decision to withdraw troops from an ongoing
international crisis in the absence of military victory is more likely to be the result of
congressional intervention than a response to negative public opinion.
While the theoretical thrust of this Article is decidedly positive, it has significant
implications for the normative scholarship on war powers. Most of the normative
critiques of presidential authority in war powers assume that government agencies or
bureaucracies are empire builders that seek to maximize their institutional powers. 7
These commentators assume that the President has an imperialistic agenda in the
national security sphere and that Congress will be more proactive in its war-powers role if
it is provided with better institutional tools. The theoretical framework laid out in this
Article suggests that as long as the President has control over the crisis escalation agenda,
it is unlikely that more sophisticated institutional tools will significantly alter Congress’s
war powers role. After the President has escalated an international crisis and mobilized
the domestic audience in favor of war, there is a strong tendency that Congress will follow
suit and accede to the President’s wishes. In other words, electoral payoff factors are
more likely to influence the congressional role in war powers issues than empire building
concerns. Correspondingly, this model also refutes the notion that Congress is impotent
in foreign affairs because it does not have adequate institutional tools to assert itself
against the President. In those instances where there is a discernible electoral payoff for
constraining the President on war powers issues, Congress has been willing and able to do

7

See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
915-17 (2005) (alluding to prevalence of empire-building approaches in the analysis of separation of
powers).
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so.8 Given the political incentives that members of Congress face on war powers issues,
neither better institutional tools nor increased judicial intervention is likely to make
much of a change to the current war powers landscape.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a positive political theory of the
war powers constitution by exploring the domestic constraints Congress and the President
face in the context of imminent military hostilities. This Part focuses on four key
questions. First, how does the President get to exercise dominion over the crisis
escalation agenda before a conflict is initiated? How does the President’s ability to
dominate the escalation agenda influence Congress’s participation in the war powers
debate? How does uncertainty about the outcome of a war influence the President’s
decision to seek congressional authorization? Finally, when is Congress likely to use
devices, such as the War Powers Resolution, to constrain President’s war-making
activities? This Part shows that these four questions can be answered by a two-level game
of domestic and international interaction in which both domestic audience costs and the
President’s desire to signal resolve to a foreign adversary influence the actual division of
war powers. Part II tests this theory by focusing on four historical case studies of the
modern use of force, including the 1982-1984 deployment in Lebanon, the 1983
intervention in Grenada, the 1992-1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the
2003 US-led military invasion of Iraq. The results of these case studies largely support the
theoretical model. Lastly, Part III explores some of the implications of this theory for
normative scholarship in war powers. More specifically, this Part argues that many of the
debates about Congress’s proper role in the War Powers Constitution may be misguided,
since members of Congress do not act as empire builders when dealing with war powers
issues, and may be averse to taking steps that increase their institutional power if taking
such steps makes them electorally vulnerable. Moreover, this Part also suggests that
efforts to have the courts police the war powers constitution may ultimately prove to be
fruitless if members of Congress do not have much of an incentive to assert these war
powers themselves. 9
I.

A THEORY OF WAR-MAKING AUTHORITY

This Part develops an argument that uses rational choice theory to explain the
actual division of war-making authority between the President and Congress. 10 The core
assumption underlying this theoretical approach is that the relevant institutional actors—
8

See James Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why The Hill Matters, 107 POL. SC . Q. 607, 622-23

(1992).
9

See KOH, supra note __ at 148.
For a useful surveys of rational choice theory, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW (4th Ed. 1992); D ANIEL FARBER & PHILLIP FRICKEY , LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991). For an application of rational choice theory to political branch interpretation of
foreign affairs powers see John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of the Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
206-08 (1993)
10
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individual members of Congress and the President—act rationally to advance war powers
decisions that are consistent with their preferences. In other words, this approach
assumes that all of these actors will pursue self-interested goals, that they will respond
strategically to each other, and they will use institutional structures when necessary to
advance their goals. The argument also assumes that the preferences of both the
President and the individual members of Congress are very heavily influenced by electoral
concerns, and thus both are very sensitive to the preferences of the domestic political
audience. Finally, this argument assumes that the President is sensitive to the preferences
of the domestic audience not just for electoral reasons, but because he believes a favorable
domestic audience will help him advance his policy agenda.11 The first section develops
this theory by spelling out the presidential advantage in framing domestic audience costs
before the initiation of a conflict. The second section suggests that uncertainty about the
possible outcome of a conflict can influence the President’s decision to seek congressional
authorization before going to war.
A.

The Early Executive Advantage: Exclusive Domination over the Crisis
Escalation Agenda

In November 2001, almost 16 months before he ordered the invasion of Iraq,
President Bush explicitly threatened Saddam Hussein to come clean on Iraq’s alleged
weapons of mass destruction program or else face the consequences. 12 When President
Bush first uttered those words, he did not seem to be doing much more than sending a
strong signal to Hussein that he should take the UN arms inspection program seriously.
By fall 2002, however, the President’s warnings against the Iraqi regime had escalated and
it appeared that President Bush was staking his political reputation on forcefully removing
Hussein from power. 13 When repeated UN inspections failed to disclose any new such
weapons, and it appeared that the Iraqi authorities were not forthcoming in disclosing
such weapons, President Bush followed through on his threat and ordered a full-scale
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.14
When President Bush originally made his threats against Iraq in late 2001, he was
not bound to follow through on them by either domestic or international law.
Nonetheless, by September 2002, public opinion polls seemed to show that a majority of
11

See DAVID P. AUERSWALD, DISARMED DEMOCRACIES 27 (2000) (arguing that even when failure
does not endanger tenure in office, an executive would prefer international success to failure).
12
See Bob Deans, Bush: Iraq may be Next, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 27, 2001, at 1A (Bush
demanded that Hussein comply with the United Nations or “face the consequences.”)
13
See, e.g., George Bush, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document, Vol. 38, at 1295 (2002)
(“The policy of my government . . . is regime change—for a reason”); We Have a Duty to Every Worker . . . in
America to Punish the Guilty, WASH. POST, September 9, 2002, at A14 (“It's a stated policy of this
government to have a regime change. And it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal to do so.
. . .”).
14
David E. Sanger and John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start of
War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, NY T IMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1 (describing the first hours of
the Iraq War.)
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Americans believed military action against Iraq was inevitable. 15 Such public belief in a
military response persisted even as key allies of the United States balked at supporting a
UN Resolution that would authorize military action against Iraq. 16 Indeed, Congress
subsequently granted President Bush the authorization to take action in Iraq even before
he had publicly made up his mind about whether he wanted to go to war.17
Why did Bush’s threats against Iraq, non-binding as they were, carry such political
weight? One possible explanation relates to the expectations of the domestic audience
during an international crisis. Political scientists have argued that political leaders in
democracies suffer from domestic audience costs if they renege on their threats. 18
According to this argument, democracies have an advantage over autocratic regimes in
signaling credible resolve in military engagements because democratic politicians suffer
“audience costs” if they make threats that they subsequently fail to fulfill. 19 Thus, one
way to interpret the public response in the build-up to the Iraqi conflict is that the public
was aware that neither the President nor Congress could really back out of the crisis
without suffering significant electoral consequences.
A much broader explanation of the President’s actions is that when he threatens a
foreign adversary he is engaging in a two-level signaling game. At the international level,
as the political scientists have observed, when an elected executive issues such threats, he
is essentially saying to the foreign adversary: “My resolve is high because as an elected
official in a democracy the political costs of backing out of a publicly issued threat are
high.” 20 At the domestic level, however, President is also sending a distinct signal to the
other branches of government: “I have committed this country to a course of action by
initiating this international crisis, and anyone who tries to get us to back out of this
course of action (including the executive branch itself) will suffer significant domestic
audience costs.” 21 In other words, the existence of domestic audience costs at the crisis
15

Richard Benedetto, President Gains Support for Military Action, USA T ODAY , Sep. 18, 2002, at
6A (Gallup poll revealed that seven out of ten Americans believed war with Iraq was inevitable in the next
year.); Adam Clymer & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Unease on Terror Fight and Concerns About War on Iraq,
NY T IMES, Sep. 8, 2002, at 1.
16
See James M. Lindsay and Caroline Smith, Rally ‘Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States
before and after the Iraq War, 21 BROOKINGS REVIEW 20, 22 (Summer 2003).
17
Susan Milligan, Congress Gives Bush OK to Act Alone Against Iraq; Senate Follows House in Voting
Strong Support, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1.
18
See James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88
AMER. POL. SC . REV. 577, 580 (1994) (arguing that a leader who backs down after “engaging the national
honor” is likely to be seen as suffering greater humiliation the more he had escalated the conflict); Alastair
Smith, International Crisis and Domestic Politics, 92 AMER. POL. SC . REV. 623, 632 (1998) (“Democratic]
leaders are able to send credible messages because they mortgage their domestic political survival on their
ability to honor those commitments”).
19
See Fearon, supra note __ at 581-582.
20
Fearon, supra note __ at 582; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M.
Siverson & Alastair Smith, An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace, 93 AMER. POL. SCI . REV.
791, 794 (1999).
21
As some commentators have noted, members of Congress who vote against a war risks electoral
defeat. See e.g., Stoll, supra note __ at 225.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

10

escalation stage provides the President with a credible tool to coerce the other branches
of government, especially Congress, to his preferred course of military action.
Members of Congress, not only have to contend with possible “audience costs” if
they try to resist the President’s war agenda at the initiation of a conflict, there are also
positive political benefits for supporting the President in an international crisis: the “rally
around the flag” effect. 22 The rally around the flag effect suggests that in the context of
an international crisis, the public will rally around the President and the flag. 23 Indeed,
when there is an international event such as a war or terrorist attack, the initial patriotic
impulse to rally around the flag gives the President a decisive boost in power and
confidence.24 As the President’s public opinion polls soar, members of Congress often find
it politically beneficial to piggyback on the President’s political momentum and do as he
wishes. 25 Thus, even before the first shot is fired, or the first aircraft carrier is dispatched,
the President can act strategically and influence the political costs and benefits of
intervention by the other branches of government.
To be sure, it is not all members of Congress that will subscribe to the rally round
the flag factor and support the President’s national security agenda. Some members of
Congress may oppose the President’s agenda for principled reasons regardless of the risks
of subsequent punishment by a domestic audience.26 Others may make a strategic
calculation that the President’s prosecution of the war is likely to go badly and hence try
to put themselves in a position to exploit opportunistically the political spoils of the
President’s misfortunes. 27 But as demonstrated later in this Article, this latter kind of
calculation is highly risky because ordinarily the President has better information of the

22

See JOHN MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 48 (1973); see also John R. O’Neal
& Anna Lillian Bryan, The Rally Round The Flag Effect In U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1985, 17 POL.
BEHAV. 379, 393-94 (1995) (finding that although the effect was far less than previously found when one
analyzes only independently selected international crises, the rally ‘round the flag is significantly affected by
the media’s coverage of the crisis); Brett Ashley Leeds & David R. Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and
International Disputes, 41 J CONFLICT RES. 814, 816 (1997) (“The salient and potent danger of a foreign
adversary quells domestic dissension and increases nationalist feelings and government support. The ‘rally
around the flag’ effect, a tendency discovered in the United States for public approval of the president to
increase following involvement in major international events”).
23
See Leeds & Davis, supra note __ at 814-15 (“Actions that serve to increase national pride and
government support and provide the executive with an opportunity to demonstrate competence… might
help a leader survive a period in which he or she may otherwise be vulnerable”).
24
See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 1970 AM. POL. SC . REV. 18,
21.
25
HINCKLEY , supra note __, at 79-80.
26
See FISHER, supra note __ at 117 (Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) opposed the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, stating that “if we follow a course of action that bogs down thousands of American boys in Asia,
the administration responsible for it will be rejected and repudiated by the American people. It should be”);
Threats and Responses; Senator Deplores Attack on Iraq, NY T IMES, March 20, 2003, at A20 (The senior
member of the Senate, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, sets forth his opposition to the Iraq War).
27
The tendency for legislators to exploit the political misfortunes of the Pre sident is discussed in
detail in section ___
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likely outcome of a conflict than members of Congress. 28 In the end, a majority of
members of Congress regardless of party affiliation tend to follow the President’s lead in
the heat of an international crisis.
This Article does not make any assumptions about what actually motivates the
presidential decision to use force, such as whether the President factors in electoral
concerns in his decision-making process. What this Article assumes is that when he
decides to use force for whatever reason, the President has a unique agenda setting
advantage over Congress at the conflict initiation stage. Some political scientists have
speculated that American presidents may have an incentive to create an international
crisis in order to divert attention from domestic problems. 29 Other commentators who
have studied the diversionary war hypothesis have found no clear evidence between
electoral cycles and the presidential decision to use force. 30 This latter evidence makes
sense if one assumes that the President is not able to easily transfer “rally around the flag”
benefits to members of Congress from his own party.31 What the empirical evidence has
shown, however, is that there is a significant correlation between the President’s
popularity rating and the use of force. 32 This result suggests that a favorable domestic
audience may be important to the President independent of electoral cycle concerns. As
the political scientists Leeds & Davis argue, “Leaders who enjoy high public support are
likely to find it easier to influence other political elites; they will have more success in
implementing their programs as they meet with less resistance from actors within and
outside the government.”33
In any event, the question remains: what accounts for the unique advantage that
the President enjoys in shaping domestic audience costs in the context of an international
crisis? The rest of this section points to two possible explanations: (1) the President’s
constitutional role as the sole organ of communications in foreign affairs; and (2) the high
public visibility and national significance of use of force issues.

28

See infra Section B.
See Diana Richards et al., Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force, 37 J
CONFLICT RES. 504 (1993); Patrick James and John O’Neal, The Influence of Domestic and International
Politics on the President’s Use of Force, 35 J. CONF RES. 307 (1991); Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The
President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SC . REV. 541 (1986).
30
See Benjamin Fordham, The Politics of Threat Perception: A Political Economy Model of US uses of
force, 42 INT’L STUD. Q 567, 570 (1998) (“Aside from Stoll (1984), most empirical studies have found no
significant electoral cycle in the use of force.” )
31
See James Campbell & Joe Sumners, Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections, 80 AM. POL. SC .
REV. 513 (1990); see also Paul Gronke, Jeffrey Koch & Matthew Wilson, Follow the Leader? Presidential
Approval, Presidential Support, and Representatives’ Electoral Fortunes, 65 J. POL. 785, 793 (2003).
32
Lian Bradley & John Oneal, Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion, 37 J
CONFLICT RES. 277, 378-30 (1993); see also John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64
AM. POL. SC . REV. 18 (1970).
33
Brett Leeds & David Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes, 41 J CONF
RES. 814, 817 (1997).
29
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The Sole Organ of Communications in Foreign Affairs

The notion that the President is the sole organ of communication in foreign affairs
is so uncontroversial that it has almost become a truism of American constitutional law. 34
The textual basis for this authority is not explicit, but courts and commentators have
assumed that it is derived from the President’s power to appoint and receive
ambassadors. 35 Nonetheless, in the same breadth that courts and commentators often
mention the “sole organ” role, they are quick to point out that the President does not
have the exclusive authority to conduct foreign policy. 36 There is not much analysis,
however, as to how the President’s organ of foreign communications role influences his
ability to shape the national security agenda.
One can view the President’s role in an international crisis as that of an agent
reacting to events that have been thrust upon him. 37 Interestingly, however, his role as
the nation’s spokesman actually puts the President in a position to create or escalate an
international crisis. By issuing threats against a foreign adversary, the President is able to
create an international crisis that might eventually require a military response. 38 Because
foreign states frequently rely on the President’s statements as representing the United
States’ position on an issue, a presidential threat also carries extra weight in creating or
amplifying an international crisis. In addition, the domestic audience also takes its cue as
to the existence and nature of an international crisis from the President’s statements.
The President’s agenda setting power gives him the unique ability to shape
domestic audience preferences for the use of force abroad. In periods of international
crisis such as when the nation faces a foreign threat, the public tends to rally behind a
singular authority who symbolizes national unity.39 As commander in chief, the President
serves as a “focal point of action” and embodies a united front against what the public
perceives is a common menace. The public turns to him for reassurance and protection
34

See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U NITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 (1996)
("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been
questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy. Issues begin to burgeon when the President
claims authority, as 'sole organ', to be more than an organ of communication and to determine also the
content of the communication..."); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1151 n.431 (2000) ("Congress has not seriously doubted that the
President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments.").
35
See HENKIN supra note __at 41-42.
36
See HENKIN supra note __at 42-43 (“[I]ssues begin to burgeon when the President claims the
authority, as sole organ, to be more than an organ of communication and also to determine the content of
the communication”); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 961 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, Goldwater
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S. 996 (1979) ("While the President may be the
sole organ of communication with foreign governments, he is clearly not the sole maker of foreign policy.").
37
See discussion at supra notes __
38
See Fearon, supra note ___at 577.
39
See Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidence
May not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 844 (1996) (“[T]he president can
establish a "focal point" around preferred public policies”).
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and they expect—indeed, they demand—that he respond by taking appropriate and
decisive action against the perceived threat. In these times, the public expects Congress
to give the President the free reign to tackle the foreign menace as he sees fit. 40
The President also has the ability frame the crisis in a manner that is most likely to
mobilize popular support for the use of force. For instance, polls usually indicate that
Americans are more reluctant to support the use of force if the sole military objective is to
impose political change on another country. 41 In such circumstances, the risk of
significant division of public opinion on the wisdom of the war increases, and so does the
chance of having a protracted and expensive conflict with a significant loss of lives. 42
However, foreign policy goals that involve curbing foreign aggression or a perceived
external threat enjoy significant popular support. 43 Through his sole organ of foreign
communications role, the President is in the unique position to frame a potential use of
force in a manner that is most likely to galvanize public support. Because the public
perceives the President as having access to superior information as to the nature of an
international crisis, they are more likely to buy the President’s position at the conflict
initiation stage that a particular use of force is necessary to contain foreign aggression,
even if subsequent developments call that motive into question. 44
In their actions of voters, citizens are also sensitive to United States’ position in
the international community as a global superpower with superior military capabilities. 45
They expect that in a crisis the President should be able to deploy force decisively and
vindicate America’s international security commitments. The American public may be
even more willing than citizens in other democracies to punish domestic institutional
actors that are not willing to use effective military force to protect the country’s image
40

See MARC E. SMYRL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION?: CONGRESS , THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
POWER TO MAKE WAR 133 (1988) (“Experience suggests that presidential military initiatives will be
initially well received by the American public . . . Expressing strong opposition to such initiatives in their
early stages, thus, is likely to be politically unrewarding for members of Congress.”).
41
See Bruce Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of
Military Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q. 49, 49-54 (1992).
42
See id.
43
See id.
44
See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64 AM. POL. SC . REV. 18, 21
(1970) (“Invariably, the popular response to a President during international crisis is favorable, regardless of
the policies he pursues.”) (quoting NELSON POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 25 (1964)); see also
CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, T HE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN
POLICY18 (1980) (“[O]nce a President has made a decision in foreign affairs that becomes known to the
public, he automatically receives the support of at least 50 percent of the American people, irrespective of
the nature of the decision”).
45
See James Meernik, Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force, 38 INT’L
STUD. Q. 121, 129-30 (1994) (“Just as presidents believe that is in their interest to maintain credibility
internationally, they appear also to believe that their domestic political reputation is dependent in part on
their willingness to use force . . . The American public appears to expect presidents to take strong action
when the nation’s interests or its citizens are threatened to preserve U.S. power and prestige. Given the
enormous and formidable American military arsenal, the public has generally assumed that an effective
application of force is readily available and easily utilized option in times of crisis.”).
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abroad. 46 Thus, when the President takes the initiative to assert America’s military
prerogative in a crisis, members of Congress may even feel more constrained than their
legislative counterparts abroad in acting as a counterweight to the President’s authority.
The United States’ unique stature as a global superpower also suggests that the
initial impulse of the American public to support the President at the beginning of an
international crisis is somewhat rational. The public understands that when a President
initiates an international crisis by issuing threats against a foreign adversary, he not only
stakes his political reputation but also that of the United States in the particular military
endeavor.47 But this high stakes gambit has significant implications for the domestic
audience: if the President subsequently admits error in his judgment and backs out from a
rapidly escalating international crisis, he not only signals incompetence by his
administration but also incompetence and the lack of credibility by the United States.
2.

The High Public Visibility of Use of Force Issues

In the eyes of the members of Congress, not all policies or issues are of equal
political relevance. Unlike the President, members of Congress are more apt to be
politically sensitive to those issues that are most salient to their local constituencies and
pay less attention to those of national significance. 48 Beyond the explicitly parochial
incentives that attract them to local issues, members of Congress also face acute
collective action problems in attempting to address issues of national importance. 49
Because the potential political benefits of addressing issues of national concerns are likely
to accrue to the institution of Congress as a whole, no one member may have an
incentive to invest the resources to understand and claim responsibility for a national
policy issue. Consequently, members of Congress are likely to be unwilling to expend
their resources and time on national issues, especially those issues that do not have a clear
electoral payoff. Moreover, members of Congress are particularly susceptible to issues
that have rent-seeking opportunities—issues were the costs to the public are dispersed
but the benefits to interest groups are concentrated. 50
46

This might explain why the United States is more routinely an initiator rather than target of the
use of force. Dan Reiter & Allan C. Stam, III, Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory, 92 AM. POL. SC . REV.
377, 379 (1998) (“States with a greater objective chance of victory will select themselves into the
population of war participants by launching wars, whereas states with a lower objective probability of victory
are selected into the population of targets of attack”).
47
See Fearon, supra note __at 578.
48
See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144-45 (1999) (observing that constituent commitments often prevent members of
Congress from acting collectively to advance their institutional interests).
49
See id.; see also Steve Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 23, 35 (1994) (arguing that Congress’s collective action problems support the argument for a unitary
executive).
50
See WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: T HE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL
ACTION 109-110 (2003). The latter phenomenon, which social scientists dub “rational ignorance,” is most
prevalent when the payoff to the general public from investing the resources necessary to understand an
issue is not worth the costs. John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
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Unlike many rent-seeking issues, however, issues like war and foreign terrorist
threats are not usually plagued by the problem of rational ignorance and interest group
politics. Indeed, the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in war or combating foreign
terrorist threats are widely distributed. Correspondingly, information dissemination about
war and foreign terrorist threats in the national media is significantly high. For instance,
during both the 2003 and 1991 invasions of Iraq, almost all media outlets dedicated a
significantly high amount of airtime to the conflicts, often providing live round the clock
coverage of developments in the battlefield. 51 Of course, there is no guarantee that the
quality of information that the public receives about an international crisis is particularly
reliable, but the relevant consideration is not necessarily the quality of the information
but the level of public engagement with the issue.
The high public visibility of war as an issue has significant implications for
congressional willingness to assert its authority on national security issues. It is not that
such highly visible political issues do not provide significant electoral payoffs to members
of Congress; they do, but the direction of the payoff is most closely related to the sway of
public opinion. But the President is most often in the driver’s seat when it comes to
mobilizing public opinion in favor of initiating a war. Thus, he is usually able to dictate
the direction of the electoral payoff for members of Congress in an international crisis. 52
The widespread availability of war and other security issues on regular news and
entertainment-oriented programs also tends to amplify the “rally around the flag” effect,
mobilizing support for presidential decisions to use force. 53
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 503 (1995) (“[P]ublic choice theory has shown that
cohesive groups, called special interests, may be able to exercise political power out of proportion to their
numbers to obtain resources and status for themselves . . . In contrast, since the diffuse citizenry has little
leverage on centralized democracy, it is rationally ignorant of much government policy”); see also OLSON,
RISE AND DECLINE, supra note __, at 25-26 (discussing how typical voters are "rationally ignorant").
Discussing the typical voter, Olson notes:
The gain to such a voter from studying issues and candidates until it is clear what vote is
truly in his or her interest is given by the difference in the value to the individual of the "right"
election outcome as compared with the "wrong" outcome, multiplied by the probability a change in
the individual's vote will alter the outcome of the election. Since the probability that a typical
voter will change the outcome of the election is vanishingly small, the typical citizen is usually
"rationally ignorant" about public affairs.
Id.
51
For an account of how pervasive media coverage of war events has become see MATTHEW
BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA
AGE (2003).
52

As some commentators have noted, one of the most unique features of the modern plebiscitary
president is his ability to mobilize public opinion in favor of nationally-oriented policy issues. See Moe &
Howell, supra note __at 145-46; Fitts, supra note __ at 890 (“[O]ne of the most important devices of a
modern president is his ability to mobilize support through the bully pulpit -- to take advantage of his
unitary and visible position as a ‘focal point.’”)
53
See generally MATTHEW BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE xii (2003).
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Uncertainty About the Use of Force Outcomes and the Scope of the Two-Level
Interaction

Although the President enjoys significant informational and framing advantages at
the conflict initiation stage, the extent of that advantage starts to dissipate during the
course of an actual conflict. The President, like any war leader, usually has less than
perfect information about the variables that affect the outcome of a conflict, such as the
foreign adversary’s level of resolve and the expected costs of the conflict. 54 Once a
conflict begins in earnest, however, the President, Congress, the foreign adversary, and
the American public can now evaluate better both the costs and objectives of the military
engagement. This new information by Congress and the domestic audience can alter
significantly the President’s dominance of the crisis escalation agenda.
Assume, for instance, that the American public and Congress get new
information about the actual costs and objectives of a conflict that differs significantly
from the original estimates given to them by the President; it is likely that their initial
enthusiasm for the use of force will wane. This learning process is the source of the
President’s dilemma: although he might be able to create easily a short-term rally in
public support at the initiation of a conflict, he is unlikely to sustain that rally if there is
military failure or stalemate. Thus, a President who is thinking of initiating an
international crisis needs to consider not only the positive domestic audience reaction at
the early stages of a conflict but also the likelihood of a domestic backlash if the war goes
wrong. In many respects, this uncertainty about the outcome of foreign military
engagements has many ramifications for the President’s decision as to whether to seek
congressional authorization before going to war.
First, a point of clarification: as used here, military failure does not necessarily
entail the outright defeat of the United States by a foreign adversary. Indeed, given the
significant military and resource advantage that the United States has over almost every
other country, the risk of outright defeat of the United States in a foreign military
engagement is relatively trivial. Rather the notion of military failure or success as used
here depends on three factors: costs (both in human lives and resources), time, and the
nature of the military objectives. All else equal, the American public will likely perceive a
military campaign as a failure if: (1) the conflict is protracted and results in high human
casualties; and (2) the primary objective of the war does not involve curbing foreign
aggression.55 Thus, if one were to develop a typology of United States military outcomes,
at one end of the spectrum representing classic military success would be a swift and
relatively costless effort to restrain foreign aggression. At the other end of the spectrum
representing classic military failure would be a protracted and costly effort to impose
54

See Fearon, supra note __ at 583.
In the latte r case, the empirical evidence shows that the American public is generally more
supportive of using force to restrain a country from aggression than using force to impose political change in
another country. See Bruce Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the
Use of Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q 49 (1992).
55
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political change on a foreign country. In the middle (ranging from success to failure)
would be a swift and non-costly effort in a mixed-motives war (both curbing foreign
aggression and internal political change), a protracted and costly effort to curb foreign
aggression, a swift and quick effort to achieve internal political change only, and a
protracted and costly mixed-motives war.
TABLE 1
A Spectrum of Possible Outcomes in American Foreign Military Engagements
________________________________________________________________
Success

Failure

Swift and non-costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and non-costly war
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political
change)>Protracted and costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and noncostly war imposing internal political change only>Protracted and costly war
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political
change)>Protracted and costly war imposing internal political change only.
________________________________________________________________
Where the outcome of a military conflict is likely to fit within the spectrum
makes a difference as to whether the President will decide to seek congressional
authorization. As explained in the next two sections, the President’s ex ante belief that a
conflict is likely to fit towards the failure end of the spectrum increases the likelihood that
he will seek congressional authorization before going to war. Moreover, the proximity of
time between a previous failed military engagement and a presidential decision to use
force also affects Congress’s willingness to constrain the President’s national security
agenda. In this context, the President’s and Congress’s calculus depends on a two level
game of domestic and international interaction. Both levels of this interaction are
interdependent because a perceived disagreement between the President and Congress
over the use of force may bolster the resolve of a foreign adversary, thereby increasing the
chance of military failure.
1.

The Domestic Level: Buying Political Insurance in Wars with Uncertain
Outcomes

Introducing a certain degree of uncertainty about the outcome of a military
engagement can radically change the separation of powers landscape. Since neither
Congress nor the President is likely to know with complete certainty the outcome of any
war in advance, they are likely to position themselves to exploit any political
opportunities that become available as they gain more information about the probable
outcome of the war. Just as presidents may find it useful to exploit their institutional
advantage at the conflict initiation stage to mobilize political support for their agenda,
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there are also opposition politicians in Congress who are willing to exploit the President’s
military failure to mobilize political opposition to his agenda. 56 When the war goes well,
these opposition figures in Congress may be content to bask in the President’s glory, but
when things wrong they are likely to sing a different tune.
Because of the downside political risks associated with military failure, the
President often has to factor in his ex-ante beliefs about the likely outcome of a conflict in
deciding whether to seek congressional authorization. Although he may be able to
initiate conflict on his own without much opposition from Congress, the incentives of
members of Congress (especially those in the opposition) are likely to change as the war
progresses and casualties mount. This consideration leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In circumstances where the President is uncertain about the
prospects of rapid military success, he is likely to resort to congressional
authorization in order to spread the political costs of decision-making among
other domestic political actors.
In this hypothesis, the proxy for whether the President is uncertain about the
prospects of immediate military success involves the scale and the announced period of
the deployment. All else equal, if the President announces a significant military
deployment (let us say over 20,000 troops) for a significant period of time (longer than 3
months), he is likely signaling a “high risk” military engagement.
The President’s decision to seek congressional authorization as a form of political
insurance is in large part driven by two considerations regarding the potential political
costs of a failed military engagement. First, when a President mobilizes the domestic
audience in an international crisis, he not only “locks in” Congress to a specific military
response, he also “locks in” himself. 57 Therefore, the President usually does not have
much political flexibility in backing out of a military engagement after he has initiated it
even if he subsequently revises his beliefs about the likely outcome. Second, the
domestic audience costs for a failed military engagement without congressional
authorization may be subject to a cascading effect. In other words, the more unpopular
56

See Todd Allee & Paul Huth, Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of
International Disputes, 46 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RES. 754, 758 (2002) (“The strategic behavior of political
opposition: In all political systems, there are political elites who seek to remove the current leadership and
assume positions of political power themselves. ….. Furthermore, although the threat or use of military
force is likely to generate short term domestic support, costly or failed attempts at military coercion will also
mobilize domestic opposition.”)
57

See James Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, 41 J.
CONFLICT RES. 68, 70 (1997) (“Tying hands signals typically works by creating audience costs that the
leadership would suffer due to the reaction of domestic political audiences to a perceived failure in the
management of foreign policy”); see also Kenneth Schultz, Do Democratic Institutions Constraint or Inform?
Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War, 53 INT. ORG. 233, 236-37 (1999) (“When a
threat generates large audience costs, there is a strong possibility that the government intends to---indeed,
has to—carry through on that threat”).
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the prosecution of a failed military engagement, the greater the chance of increased
congressional resistance, and in turn the greater the likelihood that the President will lack
the political momentum to withstand such congressional resistance. Moreover,
opposition members of Congress will be poised not only to blame the President for
military failure, but also for embarking on a military campaign in the first place without
congressional authorization.
At first blush, the President’s calculus of whether to go alone seems rather
straightforward: If the war goes well, he gains considerable political momentum for his
political agenda without having to share the political spoils of victory; if it goes bad, he
provides easy and potentially devastating ammunition to his political opponents.
Therefore, absent the seemingly vain impulse of a president who desires to take exclusive
credit for military victories, we would ordinarily expect the President to seek
congressional approval for all uses of force. But the President’s decision-making process is
not likely to be that simple. A president who seeks legislative consent before going to war
may face other significant risks such as the legislative imposition of burdensome
substantive and procedural restraints on how the actual war is conducted, premature
disclosure of secret or confidential military plans by members of Congress, and the
possibility of outright rejection of his request by Congress. 58 Indeed, members of
Congress, aware of the potential political spoils that may be available in a military
engagement, may have an incentive to impose seemingly onerous reporting, spending, and
consultation requirements on the President as a condition for providing congressional
approval.
The President’s dilemma is not as bad as it seems, however. Although the
President and Congress may both face uncertainty about the likely outcome of a military
engagement, the level of uncertainty is hardly symmetrical. In other words, the President
is almost always likely to possess better information about the likely outcome of a military
engagement than members of Congress. 59 Given this informational asymmetry, the
President can at the outset present evidence about the factors that affect the outcome of
the war, such as motive and costs, in a manner that is most likely to win congressional
support. The President may thus often get the kind of congressional authorization he
wants for military engagements without too many strings attached.
Of course, in selling the war, the President may have an incentive to exaggerate
(or understate) his beliefs about the expected costs and objectives of the war. As the war
progresses and members of Congress learn about the true costs or objectives of the
conflict, however, they can revise their judgments about the political benefits/costs of
supporting the President and try to position themselves accordingly. Indeed, risk-averse
58

See James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in
CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed.
2004); Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives, 109 POL. SC . Q. 739, 757 (1994).
59
Terry Moe & William Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, supra note __ at 132;
see also HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION, supra note __ at 102-03.
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members of Congress may actually prefer that the President go solo without consulting
them because it gives them the flexibility to jump on the rally around the flag bandwagon
if things go well, or to sharpen their swords and distance themselves politically from the
President if things go badly.
In other contexts, members of Congress may try to use the informational
asymmetry to their advantage: “I did support the war initially given the information I
originally received about the objectives and costs of the war being x, but if I had known
then what I know now—that the real objectives and costs of the war were really y—I
would not have supported it.” 60 Indeed, efforts by members of Congress to disclaim prior
support for wars that subsequently became unpopular are very common, but in such
circumstances the members of Congress often have an incentive to overstate the extent
of their prior ignorance. 61
In any event, notwithstanding the President’s informational advantages, his
decision to seek congressional authority before going to war is not costless. Indeed, in
many circumstances, he may seek to obtain the reassurance that congressional approval is
clearly forthcoming before he formally seeks congressional consent. 62 In other
circumstances, he may believe that the chance of military success is high enough that he
does not need the kind of political insurance that congressional authorization affords.
This consideration leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The President is likely to go to war without congressional
authorization when the expected costs of a war are low and the likelihood
of victory is high.
This second hypothesis is obviously the corollary to the first one discussed above.
Congressional authorization provides a form of political insurance for the President in
which he alone does not get to bear the possible downside costs of military failure. In
situations where the President is fairly sure of rapid military success, however, such as
when the foreign adversary is known to lack either the resources or resolve to prosecute a
war against the United States, he will not need the protection of political insurance. In
such circumstances, the President is likely to prefer complete agenda control over the
prosecution of the war, knowing that when the war is terminated on his terms he is surely
going to reap the benefit of a positive domestic audience reaction. From the President’s
perspective, congressional input in such “little wars” can be counterproductive because it
is likely to decrease the likelihood of immediate victory. In other words, without the
60

See ELY, supra note __, at 47 (describing Congress’ “backhanded” authorization of the Vietnam
war, done so ambiguously that if anything went wrong, it could pin responsibility for the war on the
President.)
61
See id. at 19-21.
62
See John Zaller, Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis, in T AKEN BY STORM : T HE
MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR 266(Lance Bennett & David
Paletz, Eds. 1994) (“Bush made the request [for congressional approval only after . . . he was almost certain
to receive Congressional endorsement”).
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element of surprise that unilateral action affords, the President will be constrained in his
ability to develop a military strategy that minimizes the loss of casualties in little wars.
If the downside risks of possible military failure or stalemate are significant enough
even with the element of surprise, however, the President will likely forego the benefit
that unilateral action provides. Indeed, the element of surprise may actually be
counterproductive in high stakes military engagements because the domestic audience
may not necessarily be prepared for the significant casualties or loss of lives that such
engagements entail. In such high stakes conflicts, the President will likely choose to
escalate the crisis gradually in order to condition the American public and Congress to
the possibility of significant war casualties and financial commitments. Moreover, a
gradual escalation strategy gives the President the opportunity to observe and measure
the level of public support for war before he crosses a critical threshold where backing out
of the use of force is not a politically feasible option.
While the foregoing discussion focuses primarily on the President’s incentives to
seek congressional authorization, the factors involved in a high stakes military
engagement also affect congressional willingness to constrain the President. At the
conflict initiation stage, the President usually has the ability to influence the domestic
audience costs in a manner that makes congressional approval of his war agenda likely.
However, if the President is already involved in a costly military engagement, or has
recently just concluded a failed military engagement, the public appetite for the use of
force is likely to diminish. In such situations, members of Congress have an incentive to
capitalize on the shift in public opinion and oppose the President’s agenda. This
consideration leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Congress will most likely act to constrain the President’s warmaking agenda in the shadow of a recent politically unpopular use of force.
In this context, the shadow of recent uses of force refers not only to
recently concluded wars but also the escalation of ongoing wars. All else equal, the
domestic audience will generally disfavor involvement in foreign military engagements in
the period following a war with significant casualties. 63 In these situations, members of
Congress, especially those in opposition, will likely take advantage of the unpopularity of
the war to constrain the presidential use of force. 64 Of course, members of Congress may
63

See Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SC . REV.
541, 548 (1986) (“The greater involvement in a ‘shooting war, the longer will be the period following the
war in which the public will resist any further or additional involvement that might lead to U.S. casualties.
It would be unwise for the president to consider undertakings with the risk of additional casualties, because
of the lingering resistance to foreign involvement that follows such outbreaks of war.” ); Patrick James &
John O’Neal, The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President’s Use of Force, 35 J.
CONFLICT RES. 307, 313 (1991) (“[I]n periods following U.S. involvement in a war, public sentiment will
reduce the president’s propensity to use force.”).
64
See MARC SMRYL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION 137 (1988) (When U.S. involvement …..
continues, the likelihood of Congressional action can increase if public opposition to military action
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not have the ability to curb directly the presidential deployment of troops, but they can
make the presidential exercise of the use of force much more costly by cutting off funds,
by invoking statutory consulting and reporting requirements, or by threatening the
President with impeachment. 65
The most obvious institutional device at Congress’s disposal for constraining the
presidential use of force is the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”). 66 Passed in 1973 over
President Nixon’s veto, the WPR provides certain procedures that the President has to
comply with before he introduces forces into foreign hostilities. Ever since its passage,
legal commentators of various stripes have dismissed the WPR as a toothless piece of
legislation. 67 These critics focus on what seems to be a severe loophole in the reporting
requirements of section 4. 68 More specifically, they usually point out that since only
section 4(a)(1) triggers the time limit in section 5(b), which requires the termination of
hostilities after sixty to ninety days, 69 the termination requirements of section 5(b) can be
easily evaded. 70 In other words, a president who wants to evade section 5(b)’s time limits
can simply report that a deployment falls under sections 4(a)(2) or 4(a)(3), which do not
have automatic termination requirements, rather than section 4(a)(1). Indeed, of the
over 110 uses of force that have been reported under section 4 since the WPR was
enacted, only once has section 4(a)(1) been cited—by President Ford in the 1975 seizure
of the SS Mayaguez.71 Thus, as a practical matter, Congress may often have to build a
veto-proof majority to force the President to terminate a use of force. The critics of the

develops”); James Meernik, Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, 20 LEGIS. STUD.
Q 377, 383 (1995) (“When public support for a major use of military force is not forthcoming, Congress will
likely smell blood and attempt to place constraints on the executive’s ability to further commit the nation”).
65
See generally James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy,
in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed.
2004).
66
87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548).
67
HINCKLEY , supra note __ at 99-100; KOH, supra note __ at 39-40; 128; LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 132 (1995); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 103-07
(1990).
68
Section 4 requires the President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours after any
troops are deployed: (1) “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated,” 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1); (2) “into the territory, airspaces, or waters of a foreign nation,”
id. § 1543 (a)(2); or (3) “in numbers which substantially enlarge” American troops that have already been
deployed, id. § 1543 (a)(3). Section 3 requires that the President consult with Congress “in every possible
instance” before he introduces United States troops into foreign hostilities. Id. § 1542.
69
Section 5(b) requires that any use of force under section 4(a)(1) be terminated within sixty to
ninety days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the termination deadline. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
Finally, section 5(c) requires the President to remove troops at any time if Congress orders him do so by
concurrent resolution. Id. § 1544(c). The constitutional validity of this latter provision is questionable in
light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Phillip Trimble, The War
Powers Twenty Five Years Later, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 187 (1997) (discussing the
constitutionality of section 5(c) under Chadha).
70
See KOH, supra note ___at 126-127; ELY, supra note ___ at 49 (describing “pattern of
presidential evasion”).
71
See HINCKLEY , supra note ___ at 86.
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WPR argue that this loophole transforms the WPR into a symbolic statute that does little
to enhance Congress’s war powers authority. 72
Contrary to the received wisdom, this Article argues that the WPR is actually an
ingenious statutory instrument that enables members of Congress to monitor the political
pulse of a war and intervene strategically. While the critics are probably correct that the
WPR has not proven to be a very effective instrument for enhancing Congress’s overall
institutional prerogative, it has proven much more effective in giving members of
Congress the opportunity to harness the political benefits of the use of force without
bearing much of the downside costs. More specifically, the WPR allows members of
Congress to remain agnostic and not invoke its provisions if the public momentum seems
to favor the presidential use of force, but then invoke it selectively otherwise. Thus, the
WPR can act conveniently as a sword when a war turns ugly and there are political
benefits for constraining presidential authority, and act as a shield at other times when
intervention might seem politically imprudent.
Furthermore, the ability of Congress to invoke the WPR selectively increases the
President’s political insurance costs. In other words, if the President refuses to seek
congressional approval for a use of force that subsequently becomes unpopular, members
of Congress can capitalize on the President’s misfortunes by pointing out that he
deliberately ignored a statutory scheme that was already in place. Thus, all else equal, the
President has a greater incentive to seek congressional authorization for the use of force
given the existence of the WPR than he would otherwise.
From an electoral perspective, the WPR’s reporting, consulting, and constraining
provisions serve a variety of important purposes. Section 4’s reporting requirements
compel the President to disclose any information about all uses of force, which includes
uses of force that might otherwise be conducted surreptitiously.73 By making such actions
public, Congress has an opportunity to gauge the public response to the use of force and
decide whether congressional intervention would be politically desirable. Moreover, the
termination requirements under section 5(c) also give Congress a ready-made statutory
framework to repudiate the President’s use of force decision when it becomes politically
desirable to do so. Although Congress could in theory repudiate the President’s use of
force without such a provision, such as by threatening to cut-off funds, the very existence
of section 5(c) is likely to influence the President’s calculus of whether to ignore or
accommodate congressional preferences in the first instance. As one commentator has
noted, “even if the [WPR] clock does not tick on the sixty to ninety day deadline,
executive officials behave as though it does.” 74 In other words, although presidents tend
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See KOH, supra note __at 126-127; ELY, supra note __ at 49 (concluding that the War Powers
Resolution “has not worked” due to loopholes and Congress’ unwillingness to close them).
73
See David Auerswald & Peter Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the
Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505, 509 (1997).
74
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 133 (1995).
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to routinely disclaim the applicability of the WPR, they nonetheless seem to be wary of
ignoring its provisions.
Finally, the critics are correct that the loophole in section 4(a)(1) of the WPR will
often allow the President to evade the automatic termination requirements of section
5(b).75 But it is not clear that a mandatory termination requirement would be in the
electoral interests of members of Congress. Such a requirement is likely to shift many of
the electoral risks associated with the use of force from the President to Congress. For
instance, if there were an automatic termination requirement and for some reason
Congress refuses to extend the period after the time limit expires under section 5(b) and
the war goes wrong, the public is likely to blame the individual members of Congress who
declined to vote for an extension rather than the President. 76 If, on the other hand,
Congress does grant an extension and the war goes wrong, some of the blame that will be
leveled at the President will also be leveled at those members of Congress who voted for
an extension. Many commentators may argue that this form of political burden-sharing is
desirable from the perspective of the American public,77 but it is far from obvious as to
whether it would be desirable for members of Congress subject to electoral constraints.
In any event, during a costly and unpopular war, or in the shadow of a recent
unpopular use of force, Congress has shown both its ability and willingness to intervene in
use of force decisions. Indeed, as the case studies in Part II reveal, members of Congress
have often used the WPR selectively in constraining the presidential use of force in
various politically unpopular conflicts.
One significant caveat: in deciding whether to constrain the presidential use of
force, different members of Congress face varying incentives. Members of the President’s
party may have an incentive to support the Presidential use of force even in the face of
waning public support since the President’s electoral fortunes may be closely tied to their
own. Opposition members of Congress, on the other hand, have an incentive to support
the President only when there are “rally around the flag” benefits associated with the use
of force. 78 Given these varying incentives, we might expect congressional resistance to
the President’s agenda to increase when the opposition is the majority party in Congress.
Some political scientists have actually documented a relationship between the partisan
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See, e.g., KOH, supra note __at 126-127.
See James Meernik, Congress, the President and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, 20 LEGIS.
STUD. Q at 379 (“[I]f Congress places limitations on the President, it may prevent the nation form taking a
correct, aggressive, course and thus it may be blamed by the public for interfering with the commander-inchief”).
77
See e.g., ELY supra note __ at 47 (“[T]he prerogatives of congressmen aren’t what’s at stake here.
What is at stake—and was so understood by the framers—is the judgment that no single individual should
be able to take the nation into war and thereby risk the lives of all of us, especially our young people.”).
78
See Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AM. POL. SC .
REV. 829, 831 (1998) (pointing to empirical evidence that suggests that it will be costly for opposition
parties to oppose wars that voters consider successful).
76

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

25

composition of Congress and legislative resistance to the use of force. 79 These findings
support the thesis in this Article that congressional resistance to the use of force is likely
to increase if there are clear electoral payoffs for doing so. The focus of this paper,
however, is not on the political motivations that drive individual members of Congress,
but the factors that affect the institutional capacity of Congress to constrain the
President. Thus, while this Article does not factor in the partisan composition of
Congress in its analysis, it acknowledges that during a politically unpopular war the
opposition members may have a greater incentive to constrain the President’s political
agenda.
Hypothesis 4: While the President is more likely to be shaping public opinion in his
commander-in-chief role, Congress is more likely to be responding to public
opinion when it constrains the President’s national security agenda.
As some scholars of the institutional presidency have noted, the President has the
unique ability to make the first move on a policy issue and then wait for the other
branches of government to respond.80 In the war powers context, the President’s first
move advantage is most clearly demonstrated when he uses his role as the commander-inchief to create or escalate an international crisis without having to first convince the
other institutional actors of the wisdom of his action. While Congress and the courts may
occasionally respond to the President’s use of force decisions, it is rare that any of these
other branches of government actually take a proactive stance in national security
issues. 81
Of course, when the President makes the first move on a policy decision such as
the use of force, he is not necessarily waiting for a reaction from Congress. It is more
appropriate to describe the President’s first move advantage in national security issues as
his ability to shape favorable public opinion for his preferred military course of action. 82
Correspondingly, it is more appropriate to consider a congressional response to the
President’s decision as a response to the public’s perception of that decision. Thus, in
many circumstances preceding the actual initiation of a conflict, the President will be able
to mobilize public opinion in his favor and on those occasions Congress will usually
rubberstamp the President’s decision.83 In other circumstances, such as when casualties
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See Meernik, Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, supra note __ at

384.
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See HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION, supra note __ at 14.
Koh, supra note at__ .
82
See Robert Shapiro & Lawrence Jacobs, Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking
Realist Theory of Leadership, 29 PRES. STUD. Q 592 (1999) (observing the President Johnson led and directed
public opinion on the Vietnam war).
83
HINCKLEY , supra note __ at 80.
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

26

and the costs of the war become fairly significant, the public is likely to turn against the
President and members of Congress are likely to follow suit. 84
The ability to frame and influence public opinion on use of force issues thus
distinguishes presidential action from congressional intervention. In other words, from
the perspective of the domestic audience, the President is proactive and Congress is
reactive on national security issues.
Concluding that Congress follows public opinion on national security issues does
not resolve the question of causality, however. If, for instance, the President withdraws
from a politically unpopular use of force decision, how would we know whether he is
reacting to congressional intervention or to the negative reaction of a domestic audience?
Or put differently, if the President is simply reacting to negative public opinion, how can
one claim that Congress is actively constraining the President’s national security agenda?
The answer is that President has very little incentive to react directly to a negative
domestic audience in use of force decisions. Indeed, it will often be to the President’s
disadvantage to withdraw or pull out of a military engagement in the midst of declining public
support because he will look incompetent if he does so. 85 In other words, instead of rewarding
the President for withdrawing from a politically unpopular use of force, the domestic audience
is more likely to punish him for initiating a military engagement he could not win.86 In this
sense, the same sort of domestic audience factors that make it difficult for the President to
back out of an escalating international crisis are also likely going to make it difficult for him
to back out of a politically unpopular conflict. Thus, rather than withdraw as a military
campaign becomes unpopular, the President has an incentive to escalate the conflict and
hope for strategic victories in the battlefield that will change the wind of public opinion.87
Of course, the President’s preference may not necessarily be to entrench the
troops in a war at all costs; he may on occasion prefer to pull out of an intractable military
engagement if he concludes that the war is unwinnable and that he is likely to face some
punishment by a domestic audience regardless of the eventual outcome of the military
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See Timothy Cotton, War and American Democracy: Electoral Costs of the Last Five Wars, 30 J
CONFLICT RES. 616, 619-20 (1986).
85
See Fearon, Domestic Political Audience, supra note __ at 581 (“Backing down after making a
show of force is often most immediately costly for a leader because it gives domestic political opponents an
opportunity to deplore the international loss of credibility, face or honor”).
86
See Huth & Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759 (“Opposition elites and
mass publics . . . do not generally hold more dovish diplomatic and military preferences than incumbent
leaders. Instead, they simply seek to punish leaders who adopt controversial or failed policies.”).
87
As former Secretary of State George Ball aptly put it: “Once we suffer large casualties, we will
have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without
national humiliation---stop short of achieving our goals.” (quoted in George Downs & David Rocke,
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sc.
362, 375 (1994). Downs and Rocke characterize the practice as “gambling for resurrection.” Id. at 374-77.
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engagement.88 Under such circumstances, the President may choose to terminate the
military engagement but will likely try to do so in a manner that minimizes the political
fallout from pulling out. For instance, he may insist on settlement terms that suggest that
the United States fulfilled some of its military objectives. Alternatively, he may revise his
military objectives and present the withdrawal as a victory to the domestic audience by
arguing that some of the “revised” military objectives had been met and that further
engagement with the foreign adversary would either be unnecessary or counterproductive.
In all these circumstances, however, the President is likely to consider withdrawal only as
a last resort because it is likely to result in some form of domestic audience costs. 89 Thus,
the President’s initial preference will be to gamble that the course of the war will change
in a favorable direction rather than admit defeat at the first signs of a negative domestic
reaction.
Unlike the President, members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, do not
necessarily have an incentive to support the President’s use of force decision once public support for
the war declines significantly. On the contrary, whenever opposition members in Congress perceive
that public opinion has turned against the war they have an incentive to mobilize immediately
against the President’s national security agenda.
These varying incentives between the President and members of Congress on the
question of the termination of war are rooted in the asymmetric political payoffs they face
in use of force issues. In other words, the President faces a different political payoff than
members of Congress when he decides to engage in a war even if the war has been
approved by Congress. 90 When there is a rally around the flag effect, the President is
likely to benefit from the rally effect more than members of Congress. Correspondingly, if
there is domestic backlash against the use of force, the President is more likely to be
blamed than members of Congress. 91 Since the President bears a disproportionate burden
of the costs of military failure, the opposition members of Congress might prefer to
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Indeed, in certain circumstances, the President may conclude that domestic audience costs are
likely to increase in the absence of an immediate withdrawal. See HEIN GOEMANS , WAR AND PUNISHMENT
39-40 (2003).
89
Political scientists who have studied democratic regimes and war have observed that democratic
leaders are usually reluctant to initiate international crisis unless they are assured of winning. See Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita et al., An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev. 791,
802 (1999). As Shapiro and Jacobs observe, Lyndon Johnson’s decision to withdraw from the presidential
race in 1968 occurred only after he concluded that the United States’ military objectives were unattainable.
Shapiro & Jacobs, Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership, supra
note __ at 594.
90
See Fitts, The Paradox of Power, sup ra note __ at 888 (observing that the public is more likely to
hold the President than Congress responsible for national events because of public perceptions that
Congress faces a collective action problem).
91
See id.
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terminate a conflict early even if they suffer some domestic audience costs since they
know the President is likely to suffer even higher costs. 92
2.

The International Level: Sending Costly Signals to Foreign Adversaries

In some circumstances, the presidential choice to seek congressional approval for
the use of force may be a strategic signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’
willingness to prosecute a conflict. Costly signals play a very important role in use of force
situations especially when both states are mutually uncertain about each other’s cost
tolerance for prosecuting the conflict. 93 By under-taking the costly effort to seek
authorization from Congress—an institution that includes members who have an
incentive to oppose the President’s policy—the President sends a more credible signal of
United States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict. 94
Costly signals to a foreign adversary are especially important for democratic
regimes. Assume, for instance, that the foreign adversary is uncertain about the United
States’ cost tolerance for escalating a specific conflict. The foreign adversary may
nonetheless conclude that because the United States is a democratic regime, there is
likely to be an opposition party that competes with the President for political power.
Absent the support of such an opposition, the foreign adversary may reckon that the cost
tolerance of the United States for military casualties is likely to be low because the
opposition stands to reap political benefits from military failure by the President. 95 On the
other hand, support by the domestic political opposition for the president’s use of force
decision sends a credible signal to the foreign adversary because “while the government
[in power] may have incentives to bluff (about the United States’ resolve), the opposition
has no incentive to collude in the bluff.” 96
92

See ELY, supra note __at 53 (“[D]espite the Tonkin Gulf Resolution most members of Congress
felt no compunction whatever about disclaiming responsibility for the war and blaming it entirely on the
President.”)
93
See Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences, supra note __ at 582 (observing that institutions that
improve domestic accountability of political leaders increases the chance that the leaders will be able to
send credible signals of resolve).
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Some commentators have noted that the President will seeks legislative ratification of treaties as
a costly signal to foreign treaty partners of the United States’ commitment to its treaty obligations. See, e.g.,
John Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway: Article II, CongressionalExecutive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5 (2002).
95
Indeed, leaders that face a strong domestic opposition are more credible when they issue threats
precisely because there are domestic opponents who stand to benefit politically if the leaders backs out of an
international crisis. See Paul Huth & Todd Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759.
96
Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AMER. POL. SC .
REV. 829, 838 (1998). In 1986, Caspar Weinbe rger, then Secretary of Defense wrote that legislative
participation and public support were crucial in signaling United States resolve:
Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, the U.S. government should
have some reasonable assurance of the American people and their elected representatives in
Congress. . . . The public elects the President as a leader, not a follower. He takes an oath to
protect and defend the Constitution. The people also expect a Congress sworn to the same
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Sending a costly signal to the foreign adversary may only be important to the
President when he believes that the foreign adversary has significant military capabilities
or a high level of resolve. In other words, the more the President believes that an
immediate victory is likely with a non-costly show of force, the less the value of the costly
signal. As mentioned earlier, a President who seeks congressional authorization for the
use of force risks the possibility of outright rejection of his national security agenda. 97
Thus, in the context of “little wars” where the prospects of immediate victory are high,
the President is more likely to dispense with the role of congressional authorization as a
costly signal. 98 This last consideration leads up to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Where the President is uncertain about the military capabilities and
the level of resolve of a foreign adversary, he is likely to resort to congressional
authorization to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary of United States’
resolve to prosecute the conflict.
The problem with the hypothesis above is that it involves a variable—the value of
costly signaling—which is interdependent with the political insurance variable discussed
in the first hypothesis. Often, the presidential decision to seek domestic political
insurance through congressional authorization will also implicate the presidential need to
send a costly signal to the foreign adversary. For instance, when the President seeks
congressional approval as a form of political insurance because he is worried about the
prospects of military failure, he may also conclude that the lack of congressional
authorization is likely to increase the chance for military failure. Thus, the President’s
desire to signal resolve to the foreign enemy is likely to overlap with his desire to seek
political insurance through congressional authorization.
Because the President is likely to anticipate congressional reaction when he
decides whether he wants to send a signal to the foreign adversary, it will often be very
difficult to isolate the causal variables in any particular presidential decision to seek
congressional authorization. Although the historical evidence in some of the case studies
suggest that both variables are at play, the issue of falsifiability looms large. Therefore, for
the skeptic, is may be difficult to test the theoretical framework espoused here against the
alternatives. Even with these limitations, however, the following case studies probably
provide the best method for evaluating the strength of the theoretical model. Through
the various speeches, floor amendments, newspaper reports and executive edicts referred
to in these case studies, we are given a window into some of the thought processes of the
institutional actors that drive the use of force decisions.
principles and duties. To that end, the president and leadership of the Congress must build the
public consensus necessary to protect our vital interests.
Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy, 65 Foreign Affairs 675, 686 (1986).
97
98
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THE CASE STUDIES OF PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL INTERACTION ON
WAR-POWERS

This Part of the Article examines 4 different modern case studies of
presidential-executive interaction on the use of force: (1) President Reagan’s 1982-1983
deployment of Marines in Lebanon; (2) President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of the
Caribbean island of Grenada; (3) President Clinton’s 1993 effort to provide humanitarian
relief after a state-breakdown in Somalia (“Operation Restore Hope”); and (4) President
Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.99
These case studies reveal that presidents are more likely to seek congressional
authorization in use of force situations that require extensive troop deployments over a
long period of time. Such extended troop deployments are effective proxies for the
president’s belief that the war is likely to involve a significant risk of casualties or military
stalemate. Moreover, Congress is more likely to intervene in two separate circumstances:
(1) in protracted wars where there is declining public support; (2) in the shadow of a
recent unpopular use of force. For instance, the protracted deployment of U.S. Marines
in Lebanon came under a lot of congressional fire after the October 1983 barracks
bombing that killed 239 servicemen. 100
Moreover, these case studies also illustrate certain consistent patterns in
congressional and presidential reaction to negative public opinion polls of the use of force.
For instance, in the midst of declining public support for a foreign military engagement,
presidents are more likely to try gamble on reviving public support by mounting a public
relations campaign or escalating the conflict with the hope of achieving politically
strategic victories. In such circumstances, presidents usually argue that the withdrawal of
troops in the face of negative opinion polls is inappropriate because it will send a wrong
signal to foreign adversaries of the United States’ resolve to protect its interests. On the
other hand, members of Congress seem more willing to pursue a withdrawal strategy once
public opinion turns against the use of force.
Beyond the case studies examined in detail below, presidents have shown in other
circumstances that they are willing to commit United States Forces to military
engagements without congressional authorization when the immediate prospects of
victory are high. For instance, in December 1989, while Congress was on recess,
President Bush announced that he had ordered the invasion of Panama, citing threats to
the significant American military and civilian presence in that country by the military
99
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regime of General Manuel Noriega. 101 President Bush did not even bother to consult
formally with Congress and by the time Congress came back from the winter recess in
January 1990 the invasion was over.102 Given the relatively rapid and decisive victory in
Panama and the subsequent capture of General Noriega, President Bush’s invasion
proved to be fairly popular with the domestic audience. 103 In his decision to invade,
President Bush understandably chose to dispense with congressional approval because
Panama was too weak to be much of a political risk and the likelihood of a swift military
victory was fairly high. In the end, congressional response to the President’s unilateral
action was overwhelmingly positive even though the President had effectively left
Congress completely out of the decision-making process. 104
Interestingly, there are other such instances of unilateral use of force by the
President in low-risk conflicts in the post-Vietnam era: the 1975 rescue mission on the
U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez, the 1980 Iran rescue mission, the 1986 air strikes against
Libya, the 1987 escort operations in the Persian Gulf, the 1993 air strikes against Iraq for
attempting to assassinate President Bush, the 1993 air strikes in Bosnia, the 1998 air
strikes against terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan; and the 1999 air strikes against
Bosnia.
Although the focus of these cases studies is on post-Vietnam uses of force, the
Vietnam conflict itself is also a very good illustration how presidential interaction with
the domestic audience can shape the division of war-powers authority. For instance, the
beginning of the conflict, which culminated in Congress granting the President broad
authority under the Tonkin-Gulf Resolution, is a veritable example of how the
presidential management of a crisis constrains Congress’s decision-making space. In the
tense and uncertain atmosphere following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, President Johnson
was able to frame the issue as an act of foreign aggression that required an immediate and
decisive military response. 105 Moreover, President Johnson’s strategy of escalating the
conflict whenever there was a sustained dip in the public opinion polls also supports the
gamble for revival hypothesis. 106 In other words, instead of following negative public
opinion polls when the war was going badly, President Johnson tried to change the course
of public opinion by escalating the war with the hope of achieving strategic battlefield
101
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victories. Finally, the conflict also supports the hypothesis that Congress will act to
constrain the President’s war-making initiative when there is a sustained loss of public
support for the use of force. Indeed, it was the congressional action to cut-off funds that
eventually led to the final withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia under Nixon’s
presidency. 107
A.

The 1982-1984 Intervention in Lebanon and the 1983 Intervention in
Grenada

In many ways, the interventions in Lebanon in 1982-1984 and the intervention
in Grenada in 1983 are inextricably linked from the perspective of domestic audience
costs. The Grenada invasion was commenced two days after the most tragic moment of
the Lebanon intervention: the October 23, 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut that left over 269 Marines dead and dozens injured. 108 The eventual
success of the Grenada invasion managed to divert public attention from the tragedy
unfolding in Beirut. More importantly, the significant public support for the relatively
rapid Grenada invasion most likely muted growing public distaste for the American
military role in Lebanon. When the euphoria of the Grenada invasion wore off, however,
public dissatisfaction with the Lebanese intervention increased and Congress continued
to mount resistance to the President’s Middle-East policies. As discussed in more detail
below, such congressional resistance proved to be crucial in the President’s decision to
order the withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon in March 31, 1984. In any event,
given the complex relationship between the public reactions to the Grenada and Lebanon
interventions, it is hard to analyze these two conflicts in isolation from one another.
Thus, the following two case studies will often discuss both conflicts when necessary to
understand the context of the domestic audience’s reactions to these conflicts.
1.
Lebanon. In 1982 Lebanon was a country wracked by civil war with
over six warring factions occupying different parts of the country. The United States
intervention in that country in 1982 would consist of two separate deployments. The
first deployment, which lasted less than a month, occurred in August 1982 and involved
overseeing the withdrawal of PLO forces from Lebanon.109 The second deployment,
which occurred in late September that year, involved a multinational effort to restore
order after Christian Phalangist militiamen massacred 460 people in two Palestinian
refugee camps ostensibly in retaliation for the assassination of Lebanese President Amin
Gemayal.110 Initially, President Reagan did not seek congressional authorization for either
107
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of these deployments. 111 In both instances, the number of troops initially deployed was
relatively small—less than 1,200 troops and the administration insisted the troops would
be out by the end of the year. By late that year, however, the situation in Lebanon had
worsened and the Christian-led government of Amin Gemayal had asked the countries
contributing to the multinational force to increase their presence. 112 When President
Reagan announced in December 1982 that he would seriously consider the Lebanese
government’s request to double the Marine presence in Lebanon, some members of
Congress started requesting formal reassurances from the administration regarding the
scope of the U.S. military role in Lebanon.113
Although there were occasional congressional requests to President Reagan
regarding the role of the Marines in Lebanon, Congress did not play any formal role in the
Lebanese intervention until mid-year 1983. The congressional intervention was triggered
in part by a bomb that exploded at the U.S. embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 that
killed 61 people.114 The day after the bombing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
passed a bill that approved $250 million for military and economic aid to Lebanon but the
bill was contingent on the President seeking congressional approval for any expansion of
the U.S. military role in Lebanon.115 Eventually, President Reagan signed the resulting
legislation--the Lebanese Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 (the “LEAA”).116 Although
the LEAA explicitly required that the President seek congressional authority for any
future expansion of the mission in Lebanese, it did not in any way suggest that the WPR
was triggered by the events in Lebanon or that the duration of the deployment was
contingent on congressional authorization.
By late August, events in Lebanon started to look bleak. On August 29, Druse
militia forces attacked a contingent of U.S. military forces in West Beirut and killed two
Marines. 117 The President reported these casualties to certain congressional leaders but
disclaimed that the Marines were facing any imminent hostilities within the meaning of
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.118 The President also quickly escalated the conflict and
ordered the additional deployment of 2,000 Marines in ships off the coast of Lebanon.119
By September, Marines and naval units were actively shelling Muslim militia positions in
villages near Beirut. At this stage, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the
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administration to deny that the U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities in Lebanon.
Moreover, more members of Congress were becoming more assertive about their concerns
in the ongoing crisis. 120 Congressional leaders, including Senator Robert Byrd of West
Virginia, were insisting that the WPR was operative and that the sixty-day time clock
under section 4(a)(1) was triggered once the Marines were killed in action on August 29,
1983.121 The President was also somewhat vulnerable from a political standpoint because
the first national political poll on the deployment in almost a year suggested that only 40
% of Americans were satisfied with how the President was handling the Lebanese
intervention.122
In this delicate political environment, the Congress and the President began to
negotiate the proper contours of a congressional role in the Lebanese intervention. The
President warned that any signs of congressional opposition to the deployment were likely
to send the wrong signal to the foreign adversary and terrorists. 123 The President and
Congress eventually reached a compromise position with legislation that expressly
declared that hostilities in Lebanon started on August 29, 1983, but then authorized the
deployment of the Marines for an additional eighteen months from the date of
enactment. 124 This new legislation—the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution(MFLR)—expressly disclaimed any intention to supersede the WPR even
though it effectively rescinded the sixty-day triggering mechanism under section 4(a)(1)
of the WPR. Certain provisions were consistent with the spirit of the WPR: section 7
gave Congress the authority to terminate the conflict at any time before the 18 month
time limit by passing a joint Resolution; and section 4 required that the President seek
congressional approval before expanding the mission of the Marine deployment. 125 In
signing the legislation, President Reagan praised the cooperative spirit of Congress but
also expressly made it clear that he believed that his constitutional authority as the
commander-in-chief was in no way constrained by the provisions of the WPR. 126
The political cooperation that gave birth to the MFLR was short-lived. On
October 23, 1983, a bomb exploded outside the Marine barracks in Beirut and killed 269
Marines. 127 The mainstream media quickly attacked the President’s Middle-East policies
and suggested that the public was growing frustrated with the role of U.S. forces in
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Lebanon.128 Various members of Congress reacted predictably with outrage. Barely two
days after the bombing several congressional democrats threatened to break ranks with
the party leadership and craft a proposal that would cut off all funding for the Marines in
Lebanon and force the President to withdraw the troops. 129 Even members of Congress
who supported the President acknowledged that the mood of Congress had changed
significantly and that a reevaluation of the Marine deployment would be necessary. 130
On October 26, barely three days after the bombing in Beirut, the President
ordered the invasion of the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada. 131 The reasons given for
the invasion were to quell the growing communist threat posed by political instability on
that island and to rescue American citizens living on the island who were endangered by
the ensuing political turmoil. 132 The invasion ostensibly diverted the attention of the
public and Congress from the events in Lebanon. In the midst of these two ongoing
crises, President Reagan went on national television to defend his actions.
President Reagan’s television address to the nation on October 27, 1983 was a
classic example of an attempt by the President to create a “rally round the flag” effect in
the midst of an international crisis. First, President Reagan announced that the
objectives of both the Grenada and Lebanon invasions were similar and couched them in
terms of defending American interests from a growing double threat of Soviet and Cuban
communism. 133 In Lebanon, the growing communist threat stemmed ostensibly from the
alignment of Syrian and Soviet interests. President Reagan insisted that only the United
States and the other members of the multinational force could prevent the Syrians from
toppling the government of President Amin Gemayal. 134 In effect, the President framed
the objectives of both engagements as an effort to protect the nation from a foreign
threat—an objective that would be more amenable to the “rally around the flag effect”
than intervention in the internal political affairs of another country. 135 Second, the
President tried to reassure the country that the enemy was dangerous and had committed
provocative acts that required decisive action. In the Grenada context, for instance,
President Reagan explained that that the only remnant of governmental authority
involved the imposition of “a 24 hour curfew with orders to shoot on sight anyone found
moving in those 24 hours.”136 He concluded that American citizens were under great
danger and were seeking to escape from the political chaos. 137
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In the end, both the impact of the Grenada invasion and President Reagan’s
October 27 speech proved to be very effective at shaping public perception of the U.S.
military role in Lebanon—at least in the short term. A CBS/New York Times poll taken
after the speech showed that 57.3 percent of Americans approved of the American
government sending Marines to Lebanon—up from 40% from a similar poll in September
and up from 53.8% from a poll the night before the speech. 138 Among those who actually
heard the President’s speech, however, the change was even more dramatic – 66.8
percent actually approved of the Marine presence in Lebanon.139 In sum, the President’s
speech on the Lebanese crisis in the wake of the Grenada invasion was an apt
demonstration of an executive branch effort to gamble on the resurrection of public
support in the midst of a significant foreign policy setback (the Beirut barracks tragedy).
The public euphoria surrounding the Grenada invasion fizzled out by late
November, however. By December 1983, the public mood towards the deployment in
Lebanon had changed significantly and so had the stance of major congressional leaders.
Earlier that month, 8 American servicemen were killed in a raid against Syrian
antiaircraft positions in East Beirut. 140 In a Gallup poll in mid-December, about 52
percent of the respondents said they thought it was a mistake for the United States to
send the Marines to Lebanon.141 Democratic members of Congress in the House and
Senate were busy introducing a variety of bills that would ostensibly cut-off funding for
the Marine deployment in Lebanon.142 But it was not only Democratic members of
Congress who were growing increasingly skeptical of the Lebanon deployment. By late
December, Congressman Robert Michel, the House Minority Leader, was urging
President Reagan to pull out the Marines in Lebanon as soon as possible. 143 Earlier,
Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland, another prominent Republican legislator,
announced that he would support a Resolution that would reduce the 18 month
withdrawal timeframe under the MFLR to 6 months. 144
In the face of mounting public criticism of the Lebanese deployment and
legislative threats to force a withdrawal of the troops, President Reagan mounted a public
relations counter-offensive. In his weekly radio address on December 10, 1983 President
Reagan vowed in the face of growing casualties that American troops would remain in
Lebanon until “internal stability is established.” 145 Later on at a news conference in
138
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December 14, President Reagan announced that the United States would not withdraw
its troops until the government of Lebanon had control of its territory or until the
complete collapse of order in that country. 146 But the heat for pulling out was on and by
late December, Walter Mondale—the Democratic frontrunner for the 1984 presidential
election argued that the Marines should be pulled out of Lebanon immediately.147 A
further blow to the President came later that month: on December 28, 1983 a
Department of Defense committee chaired by retired Admiral Robert Long released a
devastating report that criticized the Marine presence in Lebanon and suggested that the
Marine barracks tragedy was a result of failures in the chain of command. 148
Notwithstanding the critical tone of the Long Report, the Reagan administration
continued to campaign actively for legislative and public support for a sustained Marine
presence in Lebanon.149 But given the growing decline in public opinion polls in support
of the deployment,150 the President’s public relations campaign was clearly faltering. For
instance, a Gallup poll of January 13-16, 1984 showed that about 70% disapproved of the
way the President was handling the situation in Lebanon.151 In early January, both
Democratic and Republican leaders in the House issued a statement saying that a
reassessment of the U.S. policy in Lebanon was necessary.152 The Senate and House
Democratic Caucus eventually endorsed a proposed bill that called for the immediate
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon.153
Initially, the President was adamant and strongly opposed the proposed
Democratic Resolution on the grounds that the Resolution would clearly make matters
worse for the troops in Lebanon.154 In addition, the President seemed to react to the news
by escalating the conflict and increasing the strikes on enemy positions in Lebanon.155
Indeed, as the situation in Lebanon got worse, President Reagan’s level of resolve seemed
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to increase. 156 But by early February, however, the President caved into congressional
pressure and started drafting plans for the withdrawal of troops. 157 By February 21, the
Marines were deployed to ships offshore and by March 30, 1984 the United Stated
formally ended its participation in the multinational forces deployed in Lebanon.158
In announcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops, President Reagan insisted that the
United States was not abandoning its mission in Lebanon but had instead decided to
change tactics. 159 Less than 2 weeks after President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of
the troops and thanked Congress for its role, he went on the attack and blamed the
congressional leadership for the failures in Lebanon. The President claimed that although
Congress had approved an 18 month deployment under the MFLR, “the subsequent
second-guessing about whether to keep our men there severely undermined our policy.” 160
Various members of Congress countered this attack and argued that the failure of the
Lebanese deployment was exclusively the President’s fault. 161
The President’s effort to place blame on Congress for the Lebanese debacle is
consistent with what the theoretical model would predict. Since Congress played such an
active role by approving the Lebanon deployment and by pressuring the President to
withdraw, the President wanted to make sure that Congress got its fair share of the blame
for the failure of the deployment.162 On the other hand, members of Congress,
particularly those in opposition, were poised to exploit the President’s misfortunes in
Lebanon. Indeed, many of the Democratic Presidential candidates tried to make the
Lebanese deployment a key issue in the election. The Democratic Speaker of the House,
who had been initially very supportive of the deployment called the President’s Lebanese
156
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policy “‘the biggest blunder, the biggest mistake’ he had made in the White House.” 163
Predictably, members of Congress who initially supported the Resolution authorizing the
deployment claimed they were deceived because the President misrepresented the
prospects for peace in the region.164
The varying reactions of the President and Congress to public opinion surveys on
the Lebanese deployment were also very informative. As public opinion polls turned
against the Lebanese deployment, congressional leaders (especially those on the
opposition) turned up the heat and urged immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.
Interestingly, however, when public opinion polls in the aftermath of President Reagan’s
appeal to the nation on October 27, 1983 showed that a slight majority of Americans
favored a sustained Lebanese deployment, leading members of Congress changed their
tone during that period and resigned themselves to a long term U.S. troop deployment. 165
TABLE 2
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Intervention in Lebanon, 1982-1984 (in
percentages)
70%

ABC News / Washington Post

NBC News / AP

CBS News and New York Times

The Gallup Poll

Positive Approval Rating of President re Lebanon

60%
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10/26/83 (before
speech)
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(after speech)
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Questions: (1) ABC News / Washington Post: Do you approve or disapprove of the US sending American troops to Lebanon to participate in the evacuation plan? (08/17/82) (2) NBC News /
AP: Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan sending American military troops to Lebanon? (11/02/82) (3) CBS / NY Times: US Marines went to Lebanon as part of an international
peacekeeping force to try to prevent fighting there. Do you approve or disapprove of the government sending troops to Lebanon for that purpose? (10/26/83; 10/27/83; 11/18/83 - 11/20/83) (4)
Gallup Poll: Do you think we should keep the marines in Lebanon, or not? (9/16/1983 - 9/19/1983) Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling the situation in
Lebanon? (10/7/1983 - 10/10/1983; 11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983; 1/13/1984 - 1/16/1984) Do you think the US should withdraw its troops from Lebanon at the present time, or not? (02/10/84 02/13/84)
Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.
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The President’s response to the public opinion polls was remarkably different.
Rather than capitulate and withdraw the Marines when public opinion polls turned
against the deployment in December 1983 and January 1984, the President repeatedly
went on a public relations offensive and attempted to explain why withdrawal would be a
victory for terrorists and Syrian (and by extension Soviet) interests in the Middle East. 166
At various points in early 1984, President Reagan suggested that the enemy in the Middle
East was being emboldened by Congress’s lack of resolve on Lebanon and that a firm
policy to stay the course would defeat the Syrians’ determination.167 The White House
also tried to influence public opinion by emphasizing some of the military successes in that
region. Indeed, the White House’s positive spin on the deployment was so pervasive that
Speaker of the House O’Neill reportedly accused the President of turning a blind eye to
reality: “Every time I talk to you, you say things are going well, but there’s nothing but
deterioration going on over there.” 168 In sum, rather than concede to public opinion
polls and admit that the Lebanon deployment was a failure, President Reagan actually
tried to resurrect public support by arguing that the situation in Lebanon was better than
how the media portrayed it and that steadfastness would bring about victory in the end.
Predictably, President Reagan also escalated the crisis by bombing selective enemy targets
even as congressional and public support was declining rapidly.
Finally, Congress’s response in the Lebanese crisis is consistent with what the
model would predict. After two consecutive months of declining public approval of the
war, Congress moved decisively to constrain the President’s Lebanon military agenda. 169
In asserting its war powers role, Congress wielded the statutory tools that it had at its
disposal, such as the WPR and the MFLR, to force the President to withdraw the
troops. 170 Had the President not agreed to a withdrawal in the early months of 1984, a
congressional resolution under the WPR that would have forced such a withdrawal
seemed all but inevitable. In the end, President Reagan made it clear that in ordering
the withdrawal from Lebanon he was not following his preferred military strategy but one
foisted upon him by congressional leaders. Moreover, the White House’s harsh public
attack on the WPR and Congress’s role in the withdrawal from Lebanon is testament to
the President’s belief that his national security options were constrained. In sum,
Congress’s effective use of the WPR in the Lebanon deployment is largely inconsistent
166
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with the conventional wisdom that the WPR is a useless statutory device that has only
symbolic value.
2.
Grenada. On 25 October 1983, President Reagan
announced that forces from the United States and some other Caribbean nations had
begun landing on the Caribbean Island of Grenada.171 President Reagan announced he
had ordered this intervention for three reasons: to protect American citizens—many of
them students at St George’s School of Medicine; to prevent further breakdown in the
political situation on the Island; and to restore law and order. 172 The intervention
occurred approximately 2 weeks after a coup deposed the leftist regime of Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop. 173 Subsequently, the coup plotters executed Bishop and declared a dusk
to dawn curfew with instructions to shoot on sight any violators. 174
The Grenadian military intervention occurred in the shadow of the bombing of
the Marine Barracks in Lebanon; indeed, it occurred just 2 days after the Beirut tragedy.
In many ways the events unfolding in Lebanon played a very key role in the military
intervention in Grenada. First, the 1,900 troops that were diverted to conduct the
invasion of Grenada were actually bound for off-shore duty in Lebanon. 175 Second, the
administration explicitly acknowledged that the decision to invade Grenada was in part
prompted by the Barracks bombing in Lebanon because President Reagan was concerned
that Grenada could become “another Beirut.” 176 Third, the shadow of the Barracks
bombing framed the political landscape against which Congress reacted to the Grenada
invasion.
Like the initial deployments in Lebanon, Congress seemed to be left in the dark
on the decision to invade Grenada. In other words, the President did not formally consult
with Congress before the invasion as required under section 3 of the WPR. The President
did invite a bipartisan group of congressional leaders to the White House on Monday, 24
October 1983, but he apparently only confided in them details about a decision to invade
he had already made three hours ago.177 The President did deliver a report, however, on
the afternoon of October 27, which he mentioned that he was filing pursuant to his
authority of the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces and consistent
with the WPR.178 The House moved quickly to invoke the triggering requirements of
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR by passing the relevant legislation and the house version of
171
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Id.
175
Id.
176
See Bernard Gwertzman, An Invasion Prompted by Previous Debacles, NY T IMES, October 26,
1983, at A1.
177
See President Reagan’s Letter to Senator Thurmond, (October 25, 1983), in 129 Cong. Rec.
29,832 (1983); see also Hedrick Smith, 1,900 U.S. Troops, with Caribbean Allies, Invade Grenada and Fight,
NY T IMES, October 25, 1983, at A1.
178
See 129 Cong. Rec. 29,997 (1983).
173

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

42

the bill—H.J. Res. 402—passed on November 2, 1983. 179 The Senate version of the bill
was introduced as an amendment to a bill increasing the national debt ceiling, which was
ultimately defeated on October 31, 1984.180 Congress eventually adjourned without ever
successfully passing a two-chamber bill that formally invoked the WPR in the Grenadian
invasion.181 In any event, the invasion was over in about a week and any further
congressional action would have proven irrelevant by that time.
Although the President did not seek a congressional role in the Grenada invasion,
leading members of Congress were not indifferent about the invasion. Since it occurred
in the shadow of the Beirut Barracks bombing—an unpopular use of force incident, many
members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, had an incentive to oppose the
President’s move and they did so. For instance, Senator Patrick Moynihan condemned
the invasion as “an act of war” and added: “I don’t know that you restore democracy at
the point of a bayonet.”182 Aside from leading members of the opposition, significant
Republican members also expressed misgivings about the invasion. Republican
Representative Olympia Snowe, who served on the Foreign Affairs Committee,
summarized the odd political posture of the invasion: “I’m dismayed we’re involved in
Grenada, especially on the heels of Beirut . . . The two events raise a lot of concerns
about exactly what we’re doing.”183 Senator Weiker, a Republican from Connecticut,
also accused Reagan of “flouting the law” by invading Grenada.184 Although House
Speaker O’Neill was initially supportive of the invasion, he subsequently turned against
the President and described the invasion as “gunboat diplomacy” with “frightening” policy
implications. 185 Other members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, also complained
that the invasion was illegal because President did not comply with the consulting
requirements of the WPR .186 In addition to skeptical members of Congress, most of the
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United State’s traditional allies—including Great Britain, Italy and France—also strongly
condemned the invasion.187
Given the recent experience in Lebanon and the President’s political
vulnerability, the congressional critics of the President’s Grenada policy probably believed
that the invasion would prove to be a political miscalculation.188 In any event, they did
not obviously expect the overwhelming military success of the invasion and the resulting
wave of patriotic euphoria that followed. 189 As medical students arriving from St. George
expressed gratitude and praise to the President for rescuing them, 190 opinion polls in favor
of the invasion soared. 191 Invariably, the positive public opinion polls of the invasion were
due in part to the President’s well-managed public relations campaign. As the polls
picked up, most of the President’s critics retreated. By early November—which was a
critical time in the opinion polls—the invasion was over and mainstream media had
largely described it as a success. 192 In an astonishing concession, Senator Moynihan
retreated from his previous critical stance of less than two weeks ago and declared: “The
move is popular and therefore there’s no disposition in the Senate to be opposed to it.” 193
Speaker of the House O’Neil also did an about-face and subsequently announced that the
invasion was “justified” because American citizens on the island were in jeopardy.194 As
demonstrated in the graph below, the change in the congressional response to the
invasion in early November seemed to mirror the increase in public opinion polls in favor
of the invasion.
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TABLE 3
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Grenada, 1983 (in percentages)
100%

CBS News and NY Times

The Gallup Poll

Time Magazine

11/18/83 - 11/21/83

12/06/83 - 12/08/83

90%

Positive Approval of President re Grenada

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
10/26/83 (before speech)

10/27/83 (after speech)

11/18/83 - 11/20/83

Questions: (1) CBS / NY Times: Do you approve or disapprove of sending the troops to Grenada? (10/26/1983; 10/27/1983; 11/18/1983 - 11/20/1983) (2) Gallup Poll: Do you
approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling Grenada? (11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983) (3) Time Magazine: In general, do you feel that military activities of the US such as
those in Grenada and Central America are in the best interests of the nation or not? (12/06/1983 - 12/08/1983)
Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

On November 3, 1983, President Reagan, obviously basking in the glory of the
successful invasion, announced that the objectives of the Grenada mission had been
accomplished and that the troops would be home soon.195 In that same speech, he
claimed that the military intervention was not an invasion after all—even though he had
described as an invasion a week before—but a rescue mission. 196 The White House’s
focus on the rescue rationale of the Grenada invasion at the expense of other reasons that
were put forth for the invasion was a strategic public relations success. The rescue
mission rationale resonated really well with the American public and members of
Congress. In the end, when the military personnel involved in the Grenada invasion
returned back to the United States in mid-November they were greeted with a heroes’
welcome. As illustrated in the graph below, the success of the Grenada invasion also
seemed to increase the overall public perception of the President’s ability to handle
foreign policy. More specifically, the public approval of the President’s ability to handle
foreign policy increased during the months of October and November 1983.
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TABLE 4
Public Opinion Polls on President Reagan’s Handling of Foreign Policy, 1983-1984 (in
percentages)
100%

CBS News and NY Times

The Gallup Poll

Time Magazine

11/18/83 - 11/21/83

12/06/83 - 12/08/83

90%

Positive Approval of President re Grenada

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
10/26/83 (before speech)

10/27/83 (after speech)

11/18/83 - 11/20/83

Questions: (1) CBS / NY Times: Do you approve or disapprove of sending the troops to Grenada? (10/26/1983; 10/27/1983; 11/18/1983 - 11/20/1983) (2) Gallup Poll: Do you
approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling Grenada? (11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983) (3) Time Magazine: In general, do you feel that military activities of the US such as
those in Grenada and Central America are in the best interests of the nation or not? (12/06/1983 - 12/08/1983)
Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

The Grenada invasion exhibited all the classic hallmarks of a successful military
engagement: it was fairly rapid, it ostensibly involved the protection of American lives,
and there were very few casualties. The political risks to the President for not initially
seeking congressional approval for the invasion were also very low. Given that Grenada
was a weak and small Caribbean island with an almost non-existent military force, the
chances of military failure or stalemate were negligible. Therefore, the President had very
little need for the political insurance that prior congressional approval provides. On the
other hand, there were significant risks that seeking a congressional role would imperil
the President’s chances for a quick and decisive military victory. Given that the President
was operating in the shadow of a relatively unpopular military undertaking in Lebanon
which had recently taken a decisive turn for the worse, he was politically vulnerable.
Indeed, the Grenada invasion actually took place in the immediate wake of the Marine
barracks bombing in Beirut and at the time many members of Congress were actively
clamoring for an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. In that political climate, it is
unlikely that President Reagan would have had the opportunity to secure the quick
congressional approval that would be necessary for a rapid and decisive military victory in
Grenada.
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In the context of political branch reaction to public opinion polls, the Grenada
invasion also illustrated patterns that were consistent with what the theoretical model
developed in this Article would predict. In the immediate shadow of the unpopular
Beirut barracks bombing and the Grenada invasion, various members of Congress were
very critical of the Reagan administration and sought to invoke the provisions of the
WPR immediately. Once the invasion succeeded and the spectacle of obviously happy
and grateful rescued medical students returning home filled the television screens, many
of the same members of Congress who were initially critical of the invasion changed their
tune and embraced the President’s agenda. In all, members of Congress were simply
reacting to public opinion polls and some of them, including Senator Moynihan of New
York, were honest enough to admit it. Also, the reaction of these members of Congress
made it clear that they considered congressional deliberation over the merits of the
invasion or its legality unnecessary provided that a majority of the public had already
shown its support for the President’s decision to use force.
B.

The 1992-1993 intervention in Somalia

Like Lebanon in 1982, Somalia in 1992 was a country that was deeply
entrenched in a long and seemingly interminable civil war. In January of that year the
military regime of Siad Barre collapsed and the country descended into a chaotic civil war
fuelled by the battle for territory by rival clans and warlords. A famine ensued and by late
1992 amidst horrifying television images of widespread suffering and starvation, President
Bush decided to intervene as part of a UN humanitarian mission (“UNOSOM I”). 197 In
December 1992 President Bush sent about 28,000 U.S. troops to the region to aid in the
distribution of food and relief supplies. 198 President Bush dubbed this relief operation
“Operation Restore Hope” and it was one of the last major policy decisions he made
before leaving office in early 1993.199
President Bush did not seek congressional approval for the December 1992
deployment even though the deployment involved a significant number of troops. Public
opinion polls at the time reveal, however, that support for the intervention was
overwhelmingly high with upwards of 70% of those polled supporting the operation.200 In
this political climate, Congress was understandably deferential to the President and there
was no visible congressional opposition to the deployment. Admittedly, President Bush
also reassured certain congressional leaders that there was no risk of imminent hostilities
and that the troops were in Somalia for purely humanitarian purposes. 201
In early 1993 President Clinton took office and decided to continue the
deployment. On February 4, the United States Senate passed a Resolution in support of
197

Michael Wines, Mission to Somalia; Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save Thousands,' NY T IMES,
Dec. 4, 1992, at Section 1.
198
Senate Gives Belated Blessing to Somalia Intervention, 1993 Cong. Q. 277, 277.
199
See id; Bush Sends U.S. Troops to Somalia, 1992 Cong. Q. 535, 535.
200
See ABC News Poll, Dec. 11-14, 1992 in Table 5 infra.
201
See Carroll J. Doherty, The Reluctant Warriors, 1993 Cong. Q. 323, 323.

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

47

Operation Restore Hope—S.J. Res. 45—and declared that the Resolution was consistent
with the WPR. 202 The Resolution also requested the transfer of the humanitarian
mission to the UN at the earliest possible date. 203 The House passed its own version of
the Resolution on May 25 and the House version invoked the WPR more explicitly. 204
The Senate and House versions were never reconciled, however, so the Resolution never
really became law.
The situation in Somalia want smoothly for the first half of 1993 and the United
States started to transfer control over the mission to the UN (UNOSOM II) in May 1993.
UNOSOM II was the result of a new UN Resolution—strongly supported by the Clinton
administration—that expanded the UN mission in Somalia to include economic
rehabilitation and political reconciliation.205 By the time the transfer was completed only
about 4,000 United States troops remained in Somalia. 206 There were no American
casualties during that period and the relief effort seemed to be largely successful. Public
opinion polls taken in early 1993 continued to show significant public support for the
operation.207
By mid-year 1993, the events in Somalia took a decisive turn for the worse. With
the significant reduction of the United States military presence after the transfer of
control to the UN, factional fighting increased in the capital city of Mogadishu and the
outlying areas. On June 5, a faction led by Muhammad Farah Aidid ambushed and killed
23 Pakistani peacekeepers. 208 The UN Security Council denounced the incident and
ordered the arrest and punishment of all those responsible. 209 The United States troops—
who were originally deployed for a disaster relief mission—were ordered to get involved in
a mission to find and arrest Aidid and his accomplices. 210 But President Clinton never
sought congressional authorization for this expansion of the role of the U.S. troops.
With the expansion of the UN mission to include tracking down warlords, the
clashes with Aidid’s forces escalated. On August, 4 U.S. troops were killed in a bomb
explosion.211 Then in early September, a U.S. helicopter operation resulted in the death
of almost 200 Somali citizens, including women and children.212 Moreover, in that same
period 7 Nigerian peacekeepers were killed. 213 In the later part of September a U.S. army
202
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Blackhawk helicopter was shot down resulting in the death of 3 U.S. soldiers. 214 By late
September the public opinion polls in support of the operation had dipped to around 40
percent.215
As the public opinion in support of the U.S. role in Somalia declined leading
members of Congress started to demand withdrawal of United States troops. On
September 8, 1994, Senator Byrd introduced a bill that would automatically terminate
funding for the Somalia mission in thirty days unless Congress authorized a continuation
of the deployment.216 On September 9, the Senate passed a watered down version of
Senator Byrd’s bill which required the President to notify Congress of the objectives of the
deployment by October 15, and to seek congressional authorization for a continued
deployment by November 15. 217 In approving an identical version of the Senate bill on
September 28, the House purportedly decided to “put the White House on notice that
Congress is losing patience with a mission that has gone from feeding the starving to
hunting down a faction leader.” 218
In October 1993, the situation in Somalia reached its nadir. On October 3, 18
U.S. soldiers were killed and over 70 wounded in a firefight with Aidid’s forces in
Mogadishu. 219 As the television cameras focused on the body of a dead American soldier
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, public opinion in support of the operation
eroded dramatically. In a poll taken on October 7, public support had dropped to 35
percent from a January high of over 80 percent. 220 As public opinion in support of the
operation declined, congressional pressure for an immediate withdrawal increased. In
mid-October the Senate passed a bill that called for the automatic termination of all
funding for U.S. operations in Somalia by March 31, 1994.221 Later in October
Congressman Gilman introduced a bill in the House that called for cutting of funding for
the operation and the withdrawal of all American troops by January 31, 1994.222 Under
congressional pressure, President Clinton agreed to the March 31, 1994 withdrawal date
proposed in the Senate bill. 223
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As the model would predict, Congress and the President took radically different
approaches to the negative turn in public opinion polls after the October incident in
Mogadishu. As voices on Capital hill and elsewhere clamored for an immediate
withdrawal, President Clinton warned that the United States should not cut and run.
“Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined,” the President insisted, “and all
around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us
to change our policies is to kill our people.” 224 In the same early October speech President
Clinton announced that he was going to increase the troop levels from 4,700 to about
20,000 troops. 225 The President acknowledged that in response to the increased military
capacity of the warlords in Somalia, increased troop levels were needed to prevent
Somalia from descending into anarchy.226 He acknowledged, however, that he would pull
out the troops by March 31 but insisted that he would “leave on our terms.”227 He also
tried to distance the American military role from the UN and clarified that the troops
would be under U.S. and not UN command.228
The decline in public opinion in support of the war was also consistent with the
hypothesis that the American public support for the use of force tends to be at its lowest
ebb when the military engagement involves significant casualties and the primary
objective of the engagement involves the imposition of internal political change. Initially,
when the military objective in Somalia just involved the delivery of humanitarian relief,
the public support for the operation was significantly high. When the military objective
devolved into a manhunt for Aidid, however, the public began to view the U.S. military
as being drawn into a messy civil war that had no clear U.S. security implications. The
President was also hard-pressed to come up with any plausible argument that would
suggest that the Somali factions involved in this civil war imposed any threat to American
security. As depicted in the graph below, public opinion in support of the Somali
operation was fairly high in the late 1992 and early 1993, but declined significantly in
September in the wake of the first U.S. casualties and the killing of about 200 Somali
citizens by U.S. helicopter crews. It then dropped precipitously after the October firefight
that killed 18 U.S. soldiers.
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TABLE 5
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Intervention in Somalia, 1992-1993 (in
percentages)
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Questions: (1) Time/CNN Poll: Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of US troops in Somalia? (01/13/1993 - 01/14/1993) (2) Gallup Poll: Do you think the US should
continue its role of active military involvement in Somalia, or should it stop? (09/10/1993 - 09/12/1993) Has the operation in Somalia been successful, or unsuccessful? (10/05/1993) Do
you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (10/08/1993 - 10/10/1993) (3) ABC News: Do you approve or disapprove of Bush's decision to send
US troops Somalia? (12/11/92 - 12/14/92) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (10/05/1993; 10/07/1993; 10/12/1993) (4) CBS News:
Do you think the US should be sending US troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should US troops stay out? (12/06/92) Do you
approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia? (10/18/1993 - 10/19/1993)
Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

Finally, congressional reaction to the dip in public opinion polls in fall 1993 was
also consistent with what the model would predict. Indeed, in the wake of the October 3
incident, Senator Dole, the Republican leader announced: “If there were a vote today,
we’d be out today.” 229 Lawmakers also demanded immediate plans for a Somali exit from
leading White House officials like Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Secretary of State
Warren Christopher. 230 Formal congressional action to cut off funds for the operation
subsequently followed.231 In the end, congressional pressure on the White House seemed
to work. However, this congressional victory is subject to qualification. Given that
Somalia seemed to pose no clear risk to U.S. security, White House officials did not seem
overly concerned that a forced withdrawal would hurt the President’s credibility.232 In
other words, since the American public and foreign governments would likely appreciate
the lack of any significant U.S. interests in Somalia, the White House presumably
229

Thomas Friedman, Somalia Mission; Clinton Reviews Policy in Somalia as Unease Grows, NY
T IMES , October 6, 1993, at A1.
230
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231
Id.
232
See id. (observing that notion that a quick pullout would discredit the President is dismissed by
top Presidential advisers).

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

51

concluded that the political risks of a withdrawal under congressional pressure would not
be that significant. 233
C.

The 2003 Invasion of Iraq

In many ways, the 2003 invasion of Iraq is a classic demonstration of the
President’s unique ability to frame public opinion by escalating an international crisis.
Indeed, from summer 2002 through mid-2003, Iraq overshadowed most other issues in
the popular media. However, the presidential saber-rattling that foisted Iraq into the
headlines in the fall of 2002 started much earlier; as early as October 2001 presidential
aides had suggested expanding the war against the Taliban to Iraq. 234 President Bush
subsequently hinted at a link between al-Quada and Iraq in his January 2002 state of the
union address in which he famously described Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil.” 235
Then in an address to graduating cadets at West Point in early June 2002, the President
publicly announced the outlines of his new doctrine for preventive action in which he
urged that it would be necessary for the United States to “take the battle to the enemy,
disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”236 Later that month
the Washington Post released a report about a new national security strategy in which the
President “signed an intelligence order directing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive,
covert program to topple Saddam Hussein, including authority to use lethal force to
capture the Iraqi president.” 237
Although Iraq was already beginning to dominate the headlines by late July
2002, the President did not take his case for war to the public until later that fall. Indeed,
in mid-August the President was still urging a more cautious approach and mentioned he
was going to “look at all options” available to him before making a decision.238 By later
that month, however, the administration had changed its tone and was suggesting that
Iraq’s threat to peace in the region through its potential nuclear programs made the
removal of Saddam Hussein necessary. 239 Like what the model would predict, the
administration couched the objectives of the war largely in terms of a response to foreign
aggression: the President insisted that a preemptive strike was necessary because Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction that it could likely use against the United States and that
there was a clear link between Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda terrorists who launched the

233
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Elaine Sciolino & Patrick Tylera, Nation Challenged: Saddam Hussein; Some Pentagon Officials
and Advisers Seek to Oust Iraq's Leader in War's Next Phase, NY T IMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at B6.
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236
Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. Must Act First to Battle Terror, Bush Tells Cadets, NY T IMES, June 2,
2002, at Section 1.
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President Broadens Anti-Hussein Order, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at A1.
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Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 38: 1393 (August 21, 2002).
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Elizabeth Bumiller & James Dao, Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack, NY T IMES,
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September 11, 2001 attacks. 240 Moreover, the President made clear that waiting for Iraq
to act first was not an option: “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day,
nuclear weapons provided by Iraq, the terrorists could one day kill thousands of people in
our country or any other.” 241
While it is not clear why the White House decided to shift tactics from exploring
non-use of force options in mid-August, the proximity of a mid-term congressional
election probably factored heavily in its calculations. By late August 2002, however, it
was still unclear whether the President would actually seek congressional authorization
for the use of force. Like his predecessors, including Reagan, Clinton, and his father,
President Bush initially disclaimed any constitutional role for Congress and argued that
he could embark on the use of force solely on the authority of his role as commander-inchief.242 The political background in which presidents usually make such
pronouncements suggest that it is a tactical move: the President initially declines to
concede Congress’s constitutional authority to approve the use of force in order to avoid
establishing legal or political precedent for President acquiescence, but then subsequently
seeks congressional approval ostensibly on political grounds. In other words, presidents
seem to prefer to seek congressional approval for the use of force in a context in which it
does not look like they are bound by a constitutional requirement. In any event, by early
September the President requested congressional authorization to go to war in Iraq but
insisted that such authorization take place immediately. Furthermore, polls conducted
around that time revealed that a majority of Americans did not want the President to go
to war without congressional authorization.243
With the mid-term elections around the corner, President Bush’s decision to seek
immediate congressional authorization for the Iraqi invasion in September 2002 turned
out to be a good tactical move. In the weeks before he requested congressional
authorization, the White House aggressively mobilized public opinion by making public
pronouncements that an invasion of Iraq was imminent. 244 At the time there were deep
divisions regarding the propriety of unilateral action against Iraq in prominent circles,
including among leading Republic foreign policy experts. 245 Given these divisions, it was
important for the President to get a vote on the war before the election when members of
Congress were most politically vulnerable, otherwise a protracted congressional debate
240
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about the merits of the war would likely ensue in January. Although the public opinion
polls at the time did not necessarily endorse unilateral action by the United States,
members of Congress were probably aware that an extensive debate about the merits of
the war would not play in their favor in the mid-term election. Indeed, members of
Congress, especially those in the opposition, likely thought it would be in their electoral
interests to quickly approve the President’s request because they did not want to appear
hesitant and weak on national security issues—especially in the aftermath of September
11.246 For those democratic members of Congress who had presidential political
aspirations, support for the use of force against Iraq came early and it was largely
unequivocal.247
On October 7, 2002, days just before Congress voted on the Iraq Resolution,
President Bush once again went public to make his case for war and declared in a thirtyminute speech that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on
terror.” 248 A few days later a significant majority in the House—296-133—approved the
Resolution and it passed by an even more significant margin in the Senate—77-23. 249
Although there were some Democratic critics against the Resolution, such as Senator
Robert Byrd of West Virginia, a majority of Democratic members of Congress voted with
their Republican colleagues. Byrd had been an early and vocal opponent of the use of
force since February 2002,250 but his position did not seem to resonate strongly among his
colleagues. In many respects, Senator Byrd has been somewhat of an institutional
iconoclast on the use of force—having openly opposed presidential war-powers initiatives
since the Vietnam conflict. But most members of Congress do not enjoy Senator Byrd’s
inscrutable stature as a politician; and since these other elected officials are likely to be
more electorally vulnerable than Senator Byrd they probably decided it unwise to stand in
the way of the President’s national security agenda. Rather than insist on their
institutional war-powers prerogative, these politically cautious members of Congress
probably calculated that it was more prudent to focus their attention on domestic issues
like the economy and health care—issues that would presumably be more relevant to
their political fortunes in the November elections. 251
246
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The President’s reaction to the public opinion polls in favor of the war was
consistent with what the model would predict. Initially, the President’s selling of the war
to the American public was not easy. Despite initial tepid support for an Iraqi invasion,
the President waged an aggressive public relations campaign that focused on the
imminence of the danger imposed by Saddam Hussein and his historical belligerence in
the face of multilateral sanctions. Although the polls showed support for the President’s
handling of the situation in Iraq during much of the fall of 2002 through March 2003, a
majority also thought that that the United States should only go to war against Iraq with
UN support. 252 Nonetheless, despite reservations in the polls about the United States
proceeding unilaterally, by early September a significant majority of Americans indicated
that they thought that a war against Iraq was inevitable. 253 By late February, as
diplomatic efforts seemed to fail, more Americans seemed resigned to the prospect that a
UN-approved intervention was no longer possible and public support in favor of a US-led
intervention increased. 254 Once the war actually started on March 19, support for the war
hit the 70 percent mark and stayed there for the course of the war. 255 On March 20, the
U.S. Senate voted 99-0 in support of the President’s invasion of Iraq. 256

the elected party leaders calculated that their future electoral success would be greatest if they ‘changed the
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TABLE 6
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Iraq, 2002-2003 (in percentages)
90%

CBS News
80%

Positive Approval of President re Iraq

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
8/6/02 8/7/02

9/22/02 - 10/27/02 - 11/20/02 9/23/02 10/31/02 11/24/02

1/4/03 1/6/03

2/10/03 2/12/03

2/24/03 2/25/03

3/7/03 3/9/03

3/15/03 3/16/03

3/20/03 3/24/03

4/11/03 4/13/03

5/9/03 5/12/03

7/8/03 7/9/03

9/15/03 - 10/20/03 - 12/14/03 9/16/03 10/21/03 12/16/03

Questions: (1) CBS News: Do you approve or disapprove of the US taking military action against Iraq to try and remove Saddam Hussein from power? (8/6/02 - 8/7/02; 9/22/02 9/23/02; 10/27/02 - 10/31/02; 11/20/02 - 11/24/02; 1/4/03 - 1/6/03); Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq? (2/10/03 - 2/12/03;
3/7/03 - 3/9/03; 3/15/03 - 3/16/03; 4/11/03 - 4/13/03; 5/9/03 - 5/12/03; 7/8/03 - 7/9/03; 9/15/03 - 9/16/03; 10/20/03 - 10/21/03; 12/14/03 - 12/16/03)
Note: Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.

Rather than let the public opposition for unilateral action fester in the build-up to
the invasion of Iraq, President Bush undertook a broad initiative to convince the public
that he had exhausted diplomatic options and that Hussein’s regime constituted an
imminent threat. Through a combination of high profile speeches before the war and
carefully orchestrated televised programs that showed possible nuclear and chemical
weapons facilities, President Bush was able to overcome public skepticism of unilateral
intervention. President Bush was also able to sell the invasion as a multilateral
intervention—even in the absence of a UN Resolution—by assembling a “coalition of the
willing.”257 The rapid and overwhelming nature of the U.S. led coalition’s victory
eventually cemented public approval for the war. At the conclusion of the main ground
war, a significant percentage of Americans expressed confidence that war went well.
Indeed, public opinion polls by Gallup in April showed that a majority of Americans said
the war would still be justified even if the U.S. did not discover any weapons of mass
destruction. 258
Although the Iraq invasion officially ended about a month after it started, the
military activities in Iraq are still ongoing and it is hard to predict whether public support
257
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for the “nation-building” aspect of the intervention will last. As the experience with the
1982-1983 Lebanese intervention shows, the American public tends not to have a strong
appetite for prolonged military engagements, especially when there are significant
casualties and where the perceived threat to the United States’ security interest is not
obvious. Public support for the Iraqi invasion has declined somewhat significantly from
its peak levels in April 2003, although the President received a bump in December 2003
after the capture of Saddam Hussein. The model predicts that if public support for the
invasion falls below 50 percent for a sustained period of time (let us say two months),
congressional intervention in support of a troop withdrawal is very likely. Nonetheless,
in the shadow of the terrorist attacks of September 11, a majority of Americans still give
President Bush high marks for his efforts in combating international terrorism. Indeed,
during the 2004 election campaign, President Bush maintained a consistent lead over his
Democratic challenger on the question of whom Americans trusted more on the issue of
national security and fighting terrorism—a factor that likely contributed to the President’s
2004 reelection victory. 259
D.

The Cases That do Not Seem to Conform to the Model

The build-up to all the conflicts described in the foregoing case studies were all
consistent with what a political insurance and signaling model would predict. But there
are a variety of other uses of force (or decisions not to use force) that one cannot easily
harmonize with the stylized political insurance or signaling model. This Section addresses
three such cases: the Korean war of the 1950s; the Cuban missile crisis of 1963; and the
1999 military intervention in Kosovo.
At first blush, the American military intervention in Korea that started in 1950
seems like an anomaly because it involved a high stakes conflict in which the President
did not obtain prior congressional authorization. 260 With respect to the political
insurance that congressional authorization accords, however, one could argue that
President Truman acquired enough such insurance by successfully securing the approval
of the UN Security Council before he started deploying troops in the region. 261 But in the
modern era presidents have still sought congressional authorization for the use of force
even after the obtaining approval of the UN Security Council. 262 In any event, however,
there is less to the lack of formal congressional authorization for the Korean conflict than
meets the eye. Although Congress never formally authorized U.S. involvement in the
259
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260
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261
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262
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Korean crisis, congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle publicly endorsed
President Truman’s commitment of troops. 263 Indeed, Truman actually sought to present
the Korean crisis to Congress but was repeatedly rebuffed by legislative leaders who told
him that it was unnecessary to seek congressional authorization for what was already a
really popular decision. 264 Robert Taft, a Republican Senator from Ohio, did publicly
challenge the constitutionality of President Truman’s action on the Senate floor, but he
also made it clear that had President Truman sought congressional authorization, he
would have voted for it. 265 In the end, there is sufficient evidence that Congress had
endorsed the Korean crisis informally even if it did not do so through formal legislative
action.
One of the gravest foreign policy crises of the post-WWII era was the Cuban
missile crisis of 1963. Yet President Kennedy did not formally seek congressional
authorization before making his decision to mount a blockade to induce the removal of
Soviet missiles from Cuba.266 Moreover, President Kennedy decided not to use force
against the Cubans or the Soviets in the midst of a rapidly escalating crisis and yet he did
not seem to suffer any domestic audience costs. Indeed, the public opinion polls at the
time overwhelmingly endorsed President Kennedy’s decision to mount a blockade against
Soviet ships. 267
A broader examination of the Cuban missile crisis yields some factors that go a
long way in reconciling some of the apparent inconsistencies between that crisis with
what the political insurance and signaling model would predict. First, the Cuban missile
crisis ostensibly involved an international crisis that was foisted upon the United States in
which the President had little choice but to react. Indeed, President Kennedy
purportedly viewed presidential inaction on the Cuban Missile Crisis as possible basis for
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impeachment.268 Thus, unlike most of the conventional use of force cases, the President
did not play an active role in creating or escalating the Cuban missile crisis. 269 One could
argue that when a foreign adversary commits acts of aggression on U.S. soil, or in close
proximity to U.S. soil, the President may have no option but to react by using force or
taking decisive measures short of using force. Because it is almost certain that the
President will react in those situations, the signaling value or the political insurance
afforded by congressional authorization for the use of force diminishes. Thus, in those
instances where the President has responded to attacks on U.S. soil—such as in WWII
after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor or in Afghanistan after the September 11
terrorist attacks—the President could have plausibly dispensed with congressional
authorization without suffering significant domestic audience costs.
Second, President Kennedy’s choice of a blockade rather than a use of force
during the Cuban missile crisis also makes sense because a use of force could have
resulted in a nuclear showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States. 270 All
else equal, the domestic audience will likely not prefer a use of force incident when the
prospects of prevailing in a military engagement are trivial. Given that a full-fledged war
between the Soviet Union and the United States would in all likelihood be unwinnable by
either side, public opinion polls at the time showed a strong preference for a reaction to
the crisis that would fall short of a use of force. 271 In the end, not only did the President
Kennedy’s blockade satisfy the public’s demand for decisive action, it ostensibly achieved
the goal of preventing the further shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba. 272 In any event,
unlike the superpower confrontation at stake during the Cuban missile crisis, the United
States is not likely to confront such a formidable foe in routine use of force decisions.
Finally, the American military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also presents
somewhat of a challenge to the political insurance/signaling model. In March 1999,
President Clinton ordered air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo in order to protect
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression and also to persuade Serbian forces
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to accept NATO’s presence in the region. 273 Congress never formally approved the
Kosovo operation and President Clinton justified his unilateral action as an exercise of his
constitutional authority as chief executive and commander in chief. 274 The
constitutionality of President Clinton’s Kosovo decision eventually became the basis of
lawsuit filed by Representative Thomas Campbell and about two-dozen other members of
Congress. 275
While Kosovo seems like a separation of powers anomaly, certain factors suggest
that it could be reconciled with a political insurance model. First, the Kosovo crisis was
not a particularly high risk engagement because it mostly involved aerial attacks without
any significant commitment of ground troops. Second, President Clinton received some
congressional political insurance when the Senate (but not the House) passed a
resolution two days before he ordered the attack authorizing the President to conduct
military air operations in conjunction with other NATO forces. 276 Furthermore, the
House, which failed to support the Senate resolution authorizing the use of force,
subsequently defeated a resolution that would have required the President to remove all
troops from Yugoslavia. 277 Finally, Congress also agreed to increase funding for the
Kosovo operation,278 although it never formally authorized the war.
In many respects, the Kosovo intervention represents a low-level international
crisis in which the President sought and obtained from Congress a form of low-level
political insurance. Because the intervention involved mostly aerial attacks on Serbian
targets, it did not represent a significant enough threat in terms of potential casualties to
American troops to warrant full-blown political insurance from Congress. Thus, while
President Clinton was not averse to formal congressional approval, he probably
recognized that the political risks of the intervention did not necessarily require it.
Moreover, given that Congress was willing to increase funding for the intervention and
that the Senate had already passed a resolution supporting the use of force, the President
likely thought he had sufficient political insurance to engage in a limited aerial bombing
campaign.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR NORMATIVE WAR POWERS
SCHOLARSHIP

The widespread assumption that pervades much of the normative war powers
scholarship and judicial commentary is that the President and Congress are in a perpetual
battle for supremacy in foreign affairs. 279 Both sides of the war powers debate have
conceded that the President has won this battle. 280 But the battle for supremacy
assumption is mistaken. Congress is not an empire builder in war powers; in most
instances the incentives of individual members of Congress may actually be flatly
inconsistent with that of increasing the overall institutional prerogative of Congress. This
Article has shown that when the President first initiates an international crisis, public
opinion usually supports the President’s preferred course of military action. The positive
electoral payoffs that come from piggybacking on the President’s national security agenda
means that members of Congress have a strong incentive to initially support the
President’s use of force decisions regardless as to whether those decisions diminish the
overall institutional prerogatives of Congress. But when public opinion turns against the
President’s conduct of a war, members of Congress have political incentives to constrain
the President’s national security initiatives. As discussed in the two sections below,
suggestions that the courts or Congress mandate a more specific division of war powers
authority are unlikely to alter these political incentives.
This Article does not mean to suggest that all normative scholarship embraces a
bright-line approach to the allocation of war powers or assumes that a struggle for
institutional supremacy is undesirable. Indeed, pro-President scholars like John Yoo have
argued that both the constitutional text and structure support a much more flexible
approach to war powers in which both Congress and the President can compete for
control over war-making. 281 Yoo also points to historical sources that suggest that such a
flexible approach to war powers is also consistent with the original understanding. 282
Although Yoo does not seek to explain the war powers interactions between Congress
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and the President, the normative vision he depicts seems to accord with much of the
reality of political branch interaction on war powers. However, while Yoo seems to be less
sanguine about a more assertive congressional role in war powers, 283 the evidence does
show that members of Congress do play a more prominent role in constraining the
President’s decision to use force when there are electoral incentives for doing so.
The rest of this Article argues that the most of the conventional prescriptions for
addressing the lack of congressional assertiveness in war powers are unlikely to work given
certain realities of political branch interaction in foreign affairs.
A.

Why Congress Does not Have an Incentive to Change the Balance of War
Powers

The starting point for much of the literature regarding the proper division
of war powers is usually an effort to apply traditional interpretive canons of constitutional
law to the textual language that discusses the authority to conduct war. For instance,
references abound in the war powers literature to canonical phrases like original intent,
formalism, textualism, and functionalism. The assumption is that after positing what the
proper division should be, the relevant institutional parties, such as Congress and the
President, would then adjust their behavior to fit the outcome dictated by the specific
interpretive canon. Thus, some pro -Congress scholars have argued that Congress should
develop tools to reassert its institutional powers and re-equilibrate the perceived
imbalance in war powers authority. 284
In much of this normative war powers scholarship, a logically antecedent question
is rarely addressed: If the courts are not likely to be involved in war powers controversies,
why do we care about interpretive canons that are almost exclusively employed by the
courts? 285 Or to phrase the question a little differently, why would we expect the political
branches that usually make decisions about the allocation of war powers to care about
283

See id. at 1664 (observing that WPR has been weak in constraining executive authority and
suggesting that the constitutionality of the WPR is questionable).
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See e.g., KOH, T HE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra note __ at 185-207 (suggesting
elaborate legislative proposals to give congressional role more bite in war powers).
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Interestingly, however, many of the arguments supporting a specific allocation of war powers
authority are phrased in a manner that almost beckons for judicial resolution. In other words, like many of
the normative debates in other areas of constitutional law, the primary audience for much of this
scholarship seems to be the courts. But the courts are a very peculiar audience for such scholarship because
most constitutional law scholars would agree that the courts have played a fairly marginal role in resolving
legal disputes over the allocation of war powers. See KOH, T HE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra
note __ at 146-49 (noting the propensity of courts to refuse to hear challenges to executive authority on
foreign affairs). Admittedly, the normative thrust of some of the war-powers scholarship is a quest to get
the courts more involved, see ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY , supra note __ at 54-67, but even the most
ardent proponents of judicial intervention in war powers would admit that courts are hardly the panacea to
the problems they describe.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

62

such interpretive canons? Presumably, many constitutional scholars would say that they
should care because these interpretive canons provide mechanisms for discovering what
the constitutional text specifically prescribes. But hardly any of the political branches
would concede that they are simply ignoring the Constitution when they make war
powers decisions. The more relevant question is whether the political branches should
coordinate around any specific interpretive approach in circumstances where the
constitutional text may be subject to different interpretations. Mysteriously, none of the
normative war powers scholarship seems to discuss why the political branches would have
any incentives to take interpretive canons seriously. For instance, does either Congress
or the President really have any incentive to adhere to either historical fidelity under the
originalist approach, or to other non-historical considerations under a more functionalist
approach?
The answer is probably not. From a judicial perspective, one of the great virtues
of interpretive canons is that they encourage stability in the law even if the courts do not
all agree on the best one. 286 Indeed, some commentators have observed that the
institutional incentive that courts have in maintaining stability in legal interpretation
makes them better interpreters of the constitution than the political branches. 287
Understandably, however, interpretive stability hardly seems to be a virtue for members of
Congress who are subject to the whims of public opinion and face reelection concerns. 288
Indeed, because members of Congress are not bound by the same institutional incentives
that encourage interpretive stability in the judicial branch, some commentators have
argued that Congress may actually have an institutional advantage over the courts in
interpreting those constitutional norms that change over time. 289
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In any event, given the presidential dominance of the national security agenda in
most circumstances, Congress has an incentive to adopt an even more flexible approach
to constitutional disputes regarding the allocation of war powers. In other words, since
the President can easily shape public opinion at the initiation of a conflict, members of
Congress are likely going to resist any effort to take a “bright line” approach to
constitutional interpretation on war powers issues. Members of Congress are aware that
“bright line” rules that mandate congressional intervention under certain circumstances
are likely to expose them to unpredictable and considerable electoral risks.
Moreover, to the extent that members of Congress engage in constitutional
interpretation about the separation of powers at all, they apparently tend to rely more on
local constituency feedback and political considerations in determining the meaning of
textual provisions. 290 Since members of Congress usually operate with limited legislative
resources and crowded schedules, they are more likely to focus their attention on those
constitutional issues that directly involve local and constituent concerns like federalism,
separation of church and state, and individual rights issues. 291 Constitutional questions of
foreign affairs do not seem to factor heavily as a congressional concern. 292
Not only do electoral factors dissuade members of Congress from adopting
interpretive canons that encourage stable rules, they also dissuade them from taking
proactive legislative positions that would impose such bright line rules. For instance,
despite increasing calls by commentators to amend the War Powers Resolution to give it
more bite, very few members of Congress have ever expressed any interest in expanding
the congressional role under that statute. On the contrary, influential members of
Congress have actually lobbied rigorously to repeal the Resolution or radically narrow its
scope. Indeed, some of the most vocal support for legislative repeal has come from
members of Congress who were not even from the President’s party. For instance, both
Robert Dole and Henry Hyde—leading Republican members of Congress—introduced
legislation in 1995 that would repeal the Resolution under Clinton’s presidency. 293 Newt
Gingrich, the speaker of the house at the time, actively campaigned for Representative
Hyde’s amendment and encouraged his fellow Republican members of Congress to take
the unusual step of “increas[ing] the power of President Clinton.” 294
But Congress’s reluctance in imposing bright line rules does not necessarily
translate to wholesale legislative abdication in the war powers realm. This Article has
290

As one scholar analyzing Congressional approaches to constitutional interpretation put it:
“[M]embers of Congress [felt they] had a greater responsibility to apply and ‘assess the real world impact of
[constitutional questions" including policy consequences and the likely reaction of the public.” Peabody,
supra note ___ at 161.
291
See id. at 150-51.
292
See id. at 148, 150.
293
Robert Dole proposed replacing the resolution with what he called the Peace Powers Act of
1995, which in his words would “untie the President’s hands in using American forces to defend American
interests.” Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1995, at A 10.
294
141 Cong. Rec. H5648-01 (June 7, 1995).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

64

shown that Congress will often employ a combination of both informal and formal
mechanisms to constrain executive action in foreign affairs provided that there are
discernible political payoffs for doing so. Thus, it is not true to suggest, as some
commentators have, that “the President almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”295
To the contrary, members of Congress may often prefer to negotiate the division of war
powers authority with the President using informal political approaches where formal
legislative tools may prove to be either inadequate or politically imprudent. Hence, the
absence of formal statutory rules that establish bright line rules in war powers does not
mean that the President always has the upper hand, it simply means that one ought to
look elsewhere for a better understanding of political branch interaction in war powers.
In sum, it is unlikely that the interpretive canons of constitutional law can play a
significant role in informing the distribution of war powers. As long as courts continue to
decline to play an active role in war powers controversies, both the President and
Congress have institutional incentives to prefer an open-ended and flexible approach to
the allocation of war powers authority. Members of Congress may prefer to shift most of
the political risks of initially going to war to the President but then reserve the option of
intervention if the war takes a wrong turn and becomes politically unpopular. For their
part, presidents may also want the flexibility of seeking a more active congressional role if
they perceive a significant risk of failure in their war initiatives but then go alone when
the expected costs of war are low. In many circumstances, the institutional incentives for
both branches may run in opposite directions, but the solutions they will likely choose will
not involve the imposition of bright line rules.
B.

Why the Courts are Unlikely to Tip the Balance of War
Powers in Congress’s Favor

Congress has for prudent political reasons often declined to use its formal powers
to constrain the President in war powers issues. But even if members of Congress seem to
face significant domestic audience constraints in participating in war-powers issues, one
might ask why the courts do not intervene to level the policy-making playing field.
Indeed, one oft-cited antidote to the perceived “imperial” actions of the President in the
war powers realm is judicial intervention.296 Judicial intervention, it is commonly argued,
will tip the institutional balance of powers in Congress’s favor and encourage it to exercise
its war powers prerogative. 297
There are two compelling reasons why courts have resisted, and will likely
continue to resist, intervening in war powers disputes: (1) due to the political calculus
295
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that many members of Congress face, the courts usually assume that it is unlikely that
there is a genuine confrontation between the two political branches on war powers
disputes; and (2) the courts are probably reluctant to intervene in inter-branch disputes
in a sphere where they might have low institutional authoritativeness.
On the first point, the courts have been generally reluctant to protect legislative
prerogatives in war powers when members of Congress have failed to do so. Indeed, given
that many members of Congress often have political incentives not to confront the
President on war powers controversies, many of the disputes regarding the division of warpowers that come before the courts routinely involve what are essentially intra-legislative
disputes where a segment of Congress (often a minority) seems to disagree with the
majority’s decision. In most such cases a majority of Congress has either explicitly
accepted the President’s national security agenda or has implicitly acquiesced to the
agenda without taking formal legislative action. In other words, in those cases there has
not been a genuine constitutional impasse that might appropriately trigger court scrutiny.
Courts, probably anticipating the political spoils at stake, decline to participate in a
“political pass the blame” game by insisting that the courts will not do what Congress
refuses to do for itself. 298
Where members of Congress are unwilling to constrain executive branch
authority through legislation, courts understandably recognize that judicial intervention
might prove to be meaningless. First, where there is insufficient congressional support for
a court decision that favors congressional intervention in war powers, members of
Congress will very likely lack the political will to implement such a decision. In other
words, members of Congress who fear that greater congressional intervention will expose
them to electoral risks will have every incentive to sidestep a judicial ruling that awards
them more powers in national security affairs.
Second, courts will often lack the opportunity to monitor effectively the successful
implementation of a bright-line judicial rule regarding the allocation of war powers.
Judicial monitoring will often be difficult because there are so many procedural and
jurisdictional hurdles to bringing a legal challenge to the allocation of war powers. Since
most citizens will lack standing to bring the lawsuit, most such lawsuits will probably have
to come from members of Congress. But even if disaffected members of Congress are able
to overcome significant standing obstacles of their own,299 they are still likely to face a
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slew of other procedural obstacles, including ripeness, 300 mootness, 301 and the political
question doctrine. 302
Thus, although greater political branch collaboration on use of force issues might
be normatively desirable, those who argue that judicial intervention will prompt Congress
to take a more active role in war powers are probably wrong. Members of Congress are
not likely going to embrace a war powers role that has significant electoral risks simply
because such a role has been judicially sanctioned. Indeed, not only will members of
Congress lack an incentive to comply with such judicial decisions but judicial monitoring
of legislative compliance will often prove very difficult to carry out. At most, if compelled
to take on a more active role by a judicial decision when it is not in their political interest
to do so, members of Congress will likely substitute legislative rubberstamping for silent
acquiescence as the preferred response to the President’s use of force initiatives. In sum,
if greater political accountability for use of force decisions is the end goal, there is little
evidence that judicially-prompted congressional intervention will change the current war
powers landscape.
Finally, the risk of non-compliance with judicial decisions also implicates the
institutional legitimacy of the courts to adjudicate on war powers claims. As some
commentators have observed, courts seem to be especially wary about intervening in
separation of powers issues in foreign affairs because the popular legitimacy that underlies
judicial Resolution of domestic constitutional disputes does not tend to extend to foreign
affairs disputes. 303 In other words, when issues involve the adjudication of individual
rights claims or domestic separation of powers disputes, courts can often tap into the
popular acceptance of their role in resolving such disputes.304 In disputes regarding the
allocation of war powers, however, it is unlikely that the judicial branch will be able to
draw on the popular underpinnings of its legitimacy to secure political branch compliance
with its decisions because there does not seem to much of a public appetite for increased
judicial involvement in foreign affairs disputes. 305 Moreover, unlike in the domestic realm
where the courts play a key legitimating function in separation of powers disputes, the

300

See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that in
disputes between the political branches have to be ripe for adjudication -- meaning there must be a true
"impasse" between the branches).
301
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (holding that "a case is moot when the
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.").
302

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing six factors courts may use to determine if a
case presents a non-justiciable political question); see also Nzelibe, supra note __ at 946-65 (discussing
widespread application of political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases).
303
See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-92; Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on
the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “The Activities of National Courts and International Relations of
their State, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L 423, 426 (1994).
304
See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-89.
305
See id. at 989-90.

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art13

A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution

67

political branches have very little incentive to embrace a more active judicial role in
disputes over the allocation of war powers. 306
IV.

CONCLUSION

For too long, the war powers literature has ignored the sometimes divergent
incentives the political branches face in the context of an imminent military conflict or
international crisis. Indeed, much of that literature has tended to have a strong
normative gloss informed by conventional interpretive canons like textualism,
functionalism, or historicism. To the extent that this literature attempts to explain
political branch interaction in foreign affairs at all, it often assumes an “empire-building”
agenda by the relevant domestic actors. According to this view, the President has
prevailed in the institutional struggle for supremacy in war powers largely because
Congress has found itself without the proper tools to assert its constitutional prerogative.
For proponents of increased congressional authority in war powers, the antidote to this
perceived institutional imbalance is to have the judiciary step in and act as a bulwark
against President’s intrusion on Congress’s war powers prerogatives.
This Article suggests that the reality of political branch interaction on war powers
is much too complex to correspond to the prescriptions of any particular canon of
constitutional theory. In other words, despite the prospects of institutional tweaking by
the courts or Congress, the political branches are not likely to have much of an incentive
to conform their actions to what any specific interpretive canon prescribes, unless such a
canon prescribes open-ended flexibility. Rather, the political branches operate in an
atmosphere where their institutional or constitutional prerogatives do not often align
neatly with the electoral incentives of individual institutional actors.
In this atmosphere, far from being hamstrung by its institutional arsenal, Congress
has demonstrated that it is quite capable of constraining executive authority on the use of
force when the electoral conditions are ripe. Thus, while members of Congress may be
understandably reluctant to challenge the President’s authority at the initiation of a
conflict, they seem willing to constrain him in the shadow of a recent unpopular use of
force. Because of an academic bias towards formal congressional actions, however, much
of the legal scholarship has actually underestimated the diverse ways in which Congress
constrains the President’s war initiatives. In many circumstances, informal legislative
actions such as threats to cut-off spending or to derail the President’s legislative agenda
are often as effective (and less institutionally burdensome) as passing formal legislation to
terminate an unpopular war.
Finally, the President has an incentive to seek congressional approval for the use
of force when there is a significant enough risk that the war will go wrong. The President
either seeks legislative authorization as a form of political insurance in order to spread the
306
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electoral risks of military failure, or as a costly signal of the nation’s resolve to a foreign
adversary. Unlike Congress, however, the President rarely follows the course of public
opinion in his war powers initiatives. Indeed, a presidential decision to capitulate to a
foreign adversary in the face of declining public opinion polls is likely to be perceived as a
sign of incompetence. Thus, when there is a decline in public support for the use of force,
the President is likely to escalate an international crisis and gamble on the revival of
public support through strategic victories in the battlefield.
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